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1977] FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
III. CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Actions Under Title VII
The 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'
grant the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
power to bring a civil suit to eliminate employment practices2 which
result in discrimination against an individual because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.3 Such a suit may result from Commis-
sion proceedings' initiated by an individual filing a charge' with the
I The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 1 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. (Supp. V. 1975), (amending Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.
(1970) [hereinafter referred to as Title VII, or the Act].
2 The 1972 amendments empowered the EEOC to sue in its own right in federal
district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (Supp. V 1975). This power was not previously
given to the Commission under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (1970); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); 1 EmPL. PRAc. GUIE (CCH) 2136 (1976).
The denial to the EEOC of the power to sue implies that Congress originally viewed
employment discrimination as a private wrong not meriting public agency involvement
in enforcing Title VII in the federal courts. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROoKLYN L. REv. 62, 67 (1965). Congress
amended Title VII to empower the EEOC to sue because discrimination is a "societal
wrong" inadequately enforced by private suits alone. See text accompanying notes 30-
33 infra.
The EEOC may seek to enjoin a defendant from engaging in unlawful employment
practices. The district court may, in addition to an injunction, order any appropriate
equitable relief. Such relief may include, but is not limited to, hiring or reinstating of
employees with or without back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. V 1975). The statute enumerates various unlawful
discriminatory practices. For example, an employer may not discriminate in hiring,
discharging, or compensating employees, or by classifying employees so as to deprive
them of economic opportunities and benefits. Id. An employment agency may not
discriminate in referring or failing to refer individuals for employment. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(b) (1970). A labor union may not discriminate by denying membership to
individuals, by classifying members so as to deprive them of economic opportunities
and benefits, or by encouraging employers to discriminate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)
(Supp. V 1975).
The basic EEOC procedures for processing discrimination charges are outlined
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. V 1975). The EEOC's procedural regulations are issued
under authority of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1970), and are promulgated in 29 C.F.R. §
1601.1 et seq. (1975). The Commission's regulations essentially paraphrase and expand
on the procedures prescribed by Title VII. For a general outline of EEOC procedures,
see text accompanying notes 5-10 infra.
I An individual's charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the
alleged discriminatory practice occurred. Where the charging party has initially insti-
tuted proceedings with a state or local agency empowered to seek elimination of dis-
criminatory employment practices, the charge must be filed either within 300 days
after the discriminatory practice occurred, or within 30 days after the charging party
is notified that the state or local agency has terminated its proceedings, whichever is
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EEOC against a respondent The EEOC investigates the charge,'
determines whether reasonable cause exists to believe the respondent
engages in discriminatory practices,8 and attempts to secure concilia-
tion from the respondent? If conciliation fails, the EEOC may bring
earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975).
In Doski v. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976), the Fourth Circuit
considered which period of limitation to apply to a charge filed with the EEOC 281
days after the alleged discriminatory practice occurred, when the charge had been filed
with a state agency earlier that day. The Doski court held that the charge was timely
filed with the EEOC because it was initially filed with the agency, thus bringing the
charge within the 300-day limitation. Id. at 1333. Accord, Ashworth v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 597, 601 (E.D. Va. 1975); Ugiansky v. Flynn & Emrich Co.,
337 F. Supp. 807, 808 n.4 (D. Md. 1972). See also Vigil v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
455 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1972); Ortega v. Construction & Gen. Laborers' Union Local
390, 396 F. Supp. 976 (D. Conn. 1975); Gordon v. Baker Protective Services, Inc., 358
F. Supp. 867 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 313 F. Supp. 1404
(D. Neb. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971); 29 C.F.R. §
1601.12(b)(1)(v)(A) (1975). But see Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228
(8th Cir. 1975) (300-day period of limitations does not apply if charge filed subsequent
to expiration date of state period of limitations for filing charge with state agency);
Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1972) (charge not timely filed if
filed subsequent to expiration date of state period of limitations for filing charge with
state agency).
The Doski court's holding accords with the view that Title VII should be construed
liberally in order to effectuate its remedial purposes. Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 615
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 929 (5th
Cir. 1975); Huston v. General Motors Corp., 477 F.2d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 1973).
Therefore, courts should construe Title VII so as to resolve procedural ambiguities in
favor of the complaining party. Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Co., 437 F.2d 1136,
1138 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir.
1970).
1 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6 (1975).
29 C.F.R. § 1601.14 (1975). While investigating the charge to determine whether
it is true, the EEOC has broad power to hear testimony and investigate books and
records concerning employment practices. 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 1958 (1976).
The evidence sought, however, must be reasonably related to the charge filed with the
EEOC. See text accompanying note 19 infra.
1 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19b (1975). A finding of "reasonable cause" is a finding that a
reasonable man, upon consideration of all admissible evidence of quality and quantity
sufficient to support a reasoned conclusion, could conclude that the employment prac-
tices investigated are unlawful under Title VII. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 311
(1976).
1 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (1975).
The EEOC is required by statute to attempt conciliation with a respondent before
seeking judicial relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975). This requirement indi-
cates that'Congress prefers voluntary compliance over judicial enforcement of the Act.
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 846 (5th Cir. 1975);
Macklin v. Spector Freight Syst., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 994 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Dent
v. St. Louis - S.F. Ry. Co., 406 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1969). Open and frank concilia-
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suit.'" A persistent issue concerning these procedures is the extent to
which issues not raised by the individual in his original charge may
be raised in the EEOC's civil complaint."
tion discussions are encouraged by the provision that anything said or done in such
discussions are not admissible in court under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5b (Supp. 1975).
EEOC v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9793, at 6312 (W.D.
Ky. 1974). Conciliation is advantageous to the employer. There is no public or judicial
acknowledgement that Title VII has been vi6lated, and issues which would otherwise
be raised in a later EEOC complaint are resolved relatively quickly and inexpensively.
1 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1483 (1976).
10 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25 (1975). A timely charge must be filed with the EEOC and
the charging party must receive notice that he has a right to sue before an individual
or class action suit under Title VII may be instituted. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). The letter notifying the party of his right to sue is
sent when the EEOC determines that reasonable cause to believe the respondent
discriminates does not exist, when conciliation attempts are terminated, or when the
EEOC has not filed suit within 180 days after receipt of the charge, if the charging
party requests that such a letter be sent. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
Once conciliation fails, EEOC regulations provide that an informal letter be sent
to the charging party notifying him that conciliation has failed and advising him that
he may request a formal letter advising him of his right to sue. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25
(1975). In Garner v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 538 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1976), the
Fourth Circuit considered whether the 90-day limitation period for instituting suit
begins to run from the date the first informal letter is received or from the date the
second formal letter is received. In Garner, the suit was filed within 90 days after
receipt of the first letter. The company argued that the first letter qualified as notice
under the statute, and that the 90-day limitation period should run from the date the
first letter was received.
The Garner court held that the 90-day limitation period does not begin to run until
the charging party receives the formal letter notifying him he has a right to sue. The
EEOC has the power to designate that the second, formal letter fulfills this require-
ment under the Commission's broad power granted in 42 U.S.C. § 200e-12 (1970) to
formulate its own procedures. Id. at 115. Accord, Lacy v. Chrysler Corp. 533 F.2d 353
(8th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976);
Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Co., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971). See Tuft v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052
(1976) (the 90-day period commences upon one of three events: the EEOC notifies the
charging party it has determined that reasonable cause does not exist; within 180 days
after the EEOC determination that reasonable cause does exist, the party requests a
formal letter advising him of his right to sue; or, after attempted conciliation fails, the
EEOC formally notifies the party he has a right to sue). Cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404
U.S. 522 (1972) (liberal construction of procedures is appropriate where individuals
initiate enforcement process under Title VII); Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (the term "notice" should be interpreted to further the humanitarian purpose
of Title VII to proscribe employment discrimination). But see DeMatteis v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975) (90-day limitation period begins on date upon
which charging party is notified that conciliation attempts have been terminated,
unless such notification misleads charging party into filing an untimely action).
" Compare EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1976) with
EEOC v. Copeland Corp., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9780 (S.D. Ohio 1974) and EEOC v.
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The Permisible Scope of an EEOC Complaint
In EEOC v. General Electric Co.,"2 the Fourth Circuit held that
an EEOC complaint may raise any claim concerning discrimination
uncovered during a reasonable investigation of the charge, provided
such discrimination was the subject of a reasonable cause determina-
tion and subsequent conciliation attempts. 3 In General Electric, two
black employees filed charges with the EEOC alleging that General
Electric engaged in racially discriminatory hiring, promotion, and
transfer policies. After investigating the charges, the EEOC con-
cluded that reasonable cause did not exist to believe the company en-
gaged in racially discriminatory hiring practices, but that reasonable
cause did exist to believe the company engaged in racially discrimi-
natory promotion and transfer policies. The Commission also con-
cluded, from evidence uncovered in its investigation into the hiring
practices of the company, that reasonable cause existed to believe
General Electric engaged in sexually discriminatory hiring practices.
Attempted conciliation of these issues was unsuccessful, and the
EEOC brought suit against the company. In its complaint the EEOC
consolidated the claims that General Electric engaged in both ra-
cially and sexually discriminatory employment practices. The dis-
trict court dismissed the claim alleging sex discrimination on the
ground that the original charging party, a man, did not have standing
to claim that the company discriminated against women." The court
held that where the EEOC's complaint is based on an individual's
charge filed with the Commission, the claims which can be raised in
that complaint are limited to those which the charging individual
could raise in court.
5
In a split decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court,
New York Times Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
12 532 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976).
'3 Id. at 366.
" EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757, 761 (W.D. Va. 1974).
" Id. at 761. The district court apparently based its decision on an implicit as-
sumption that when the EEOC's civil suit is based on an original charge, the EEOC
sues as the charging individual's surrogate. Thus, the EEOC has standing to raise in
its complaint only those issues which the charging individual could raise in a civil
complaint. Id. Accord, EEOC v. Copeland Corp., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9780 (S.D. Ohio
1974); EEOC v. United States Indus., Inc., 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. T 9068 (W.D. Tenn.
1974); EEOC v. New York Times Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 651 (W.D.
Tenn. 1973). If the charging party in General Electric sued, he would not have standing
to assert that the company engaged in discriminatory hiring practices against women
because he himself had not been injured by such practices. See 1 E PL. PRAc. Gum.
(CCH) 2128 (1976).
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concluding that the court overvalued the importance of the individ-
ual's charge filed with the EEOC.16 Although the filing of the charge
results in notice to a respondent17 that he is possibly violating Title
VII, the principal importance of the charge is that it grants the EEOC
jurisdiction to investigate whether the respondent has engaged in
unlawful discriminatory practices. 8 The investigatory powers of the
EEOC are broad, limited only to the extent that information and
evidence sought by the Commission must be relevant and material
to the facts alleged in the charge. 9 A "reasonable investigation", so
defined, frequently uncovers discriminatory practices other than
those alleged in the charge.2" These practices may also be the subject
of a judicial complaint filed by the EEOC. 21 The Fourth Circuit
aligned itself with the Fifth and SixthS Circuits, determining that
the scope of the EEOC complaint may encompass any facts, issues,
and discriminatory practices uncovered during a reasonable investi-
"1 532 F.2d at 364. The General Electric court analogized charges filed with the
EEOC to administrative pleadings, of which it has been said that "the most important
characteristic of pleadings in the administrative process is their unimportance." 1 K.
DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §8.04 at 523 (1958).
11 29 C.F.R. §1601.13 (1972).
Is 532 F.2d at 364-65. EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th
Cir. 1975); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970); EEOC
v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1335 (D. Del. 1974), affd 516
F.2d 1297 (3rd Cir. 1975).
19 EEOC v. University of N. M., 504 F.2d 1296, 1301 (10th Cir. 1974). See Moto-
rola, Inc. v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 932 (1974);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Sape & Hart, Title
VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportuniiy Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 824, 871-72 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sape & Hart].
The EEOC is empowered to examine evidence concerning any person under inves-
tigation, so long as the evidence relates to unlawful employment practices and is
relevant to the charge under investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (a) (1970). The EEOC
has the same power as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to require access
to evidence relating to any matter under investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (Supp. V
1975). The NLRB can require access to evidence relating to.any matter under investi-
gation. 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1970).
2 EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975).
21 532 F.2d at 366.
2 EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir.1975) (although
charging party settles claim with employer, EEOC complaint may raise claims of any
discriminatory practices uncovered in reasonable investigaton of original charge);
EEOC v. National Cash Register Co., 405 F. Supp. 562, 568 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1363 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 994 (1975) (EEOC's charge may encompass allegations of discrimination uncov-
ered in reasonable investigation of original charge); EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co.,
525 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1975).
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gation of the original charge."
The General Electric court found that the claim alleging sexually
discriminatory hiring practices was derived from a reasonable investi-
gation of the charge of racially discriminatory hiring practices.7 The
company administered two different series of tests to male and fe-
male job applicants, and evaluated the test results differently in de-
ciding whether to hire employees of either sex. Because the admin-
istration of these tests formed an integral part of General Electric's
hiring practices, the tests were found to be a proper focus of the
EEOC's investigation concerning the charge of racially discrimina-
tory hiring practices.2 1 Upon a full review of its investigation, the
EEOC determined that reasonable cause existed to believe the com-
pany engaged in sexually discriminatory hiring practices,2 and sub-
sequently raised that claim in its complaint. The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that where employment practices questioned in an original
charge were revealed by investigation to be a "root-source" of more
than one kind of discrimination, the EEOC need not confine either
its investigation or its civil complaint to the particular symptom of
discrimination alleged in the original charge.
29
General Electric is based on the premise that Congress amended
Title VII, empowering the EEOC to institute suit, in recognition that
24 532 F.2d at 366.
2 Id. at 369.
2' The use of employment tests, particularly where used in evaluating the qualifi-
cations of job applicants, frequently has discriminatory results. In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), the Supreme Court held that the use of employ-
ment tests should be permitted only where test performance is demonstrated to have
a high degree of job-relatedness. For an analysis of Griggs and various methods for
determining the job relatedness of tests, see Wilson,-A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke
Power Company: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the
Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REv. 855 (1972). See also Note, Testing for Special Skills in
Employment: A New Approach to Judicial Review, 1976 DUKE L. J. 596.
The EEOC standards for validation of tests are promulgated in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1
et. seq. (1975). See generally Note, Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employ-
ment Test Validation: A Uniform Standard for Both Public and Private Employers,
41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 505 (1973).
2 532 F.2d at 362.
2' EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975); EEOC v.
E. 1. duPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1335-36 (D. Del. 1974), aff'd, 516
F.2d 1297 (3rd Cir. 1975). Courts should carefully scrutinize whether facts and issues
raised in the EEOC complaint actually were uncovered in a reasonable investigation
of a charge. A tendency by the Commission to conduct unreasonably broad investiga-
tions of charges has been alleged to be significant cause of a steadily increasing backlog
of cases pending before the Commission. Rabinowitz, The Bias in the Government's
Anti-Bias Agency, FORTUNE, Dec. 1976, at 138, 139-140.
21 532 F.2d at 366.
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discrimination is a "societal wrong,"' 0 and that private suits alone are
inadequate to effectuate the public policy against discrimination.'
The EEOC, therefore, sues to "vindicate the public interest,"3" which
is broader than the private interests of both the party charging dis-
criminatory employment practices and the respondent to these
charges.3 Consequently, the EEOC's ability to raise issues in its civil
complaint should not be circumscribed by the ability of the original
charging party to raise those issues in a civil complaint .
3
General Electric contended, however, that despite this interpreta-
tion of the purpose of the amendments, the claim of sexual discrimi-
nation should nevertheless have been dismissed. The procedures pre-
scribed under Title VII require that the respondent be allowed to
comment on the charge after it is filed, but before it is investigated.3 5
30 532 F.2d 372-73. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975);
note 2 supra.
' 532 F.2d at 373. See Note, The Tentative Settlement Class and Class Action
Suits Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1462, 1463 (1974). See
generally Sape & Hart, "supra note 19, at 824-25, 836-46, 875-80.
The House Report on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 stated that
the EEOC should be provided effective enforcement powers because effective remedies
had not resulted from previous practices limiting the EEOC's role to merely that of
conciliator. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2139.
32 EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 994 (1975); EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 411 F. Supp. 97, 102-03 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
* EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1362 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 994 (1975). Cf. Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969)
(EEOC has broad power to seek evidence relating to employment practices, and may
consider that evidence in conciliation efforts to fashion relief affecting employees other
than original charging party).
11 532 F.2d at 373. See cases cited notes 22-23 supra; EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
362 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1973). Cf. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d
455 (5th Cir. 1970) (individual's complaint may raise additional claims of discrimina-
tion uncovered during reasonable investigation of his charge). Contra, EEOC v. West-
vaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974) (where EEOC complaint is based on
individual's charge, the complaint may not raise any claims the charing party could
not raise in court.); EEOC v. New York Times Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 364 F. Supp.
651, 653 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (where charge filed by white female, EEOC complaint may
not raise claims of racially discriminatory hiring practices). See also Hunter & Branch,
Equal Employment Opportunities: Judicial Developments Under Title WI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, How. L. J.
543 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hunter & Branch].
2 532 F.2d at 370. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14 (1975) provides in pertinent part that "[a]s
a part of each investigation, . . . the respondent shall. . . be offered an opportunity
to submit a statement of its position with respect to the allegations" (emphasis sup-
plied). The respondent also "may" be afforded an opportunity to engage in settlement
discussions after investigation but before a reasonable cause determination is issued.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.19a (1975).
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The company contended that this procedure had been violated. Be-
cause no charge of sexual discrimination had been filed, General
Electric was denied the opportunity required by the regulation to
comment on the charge before it was investigated. The company
argued that substantial prejudice resulted from the violation because
it was deprived of a significant opportunity to resolve voluntarily the
charge of sex discrimination." General Electric also averred that
where investigation of an original charge discloses additional kinds
of discrimination not alleged in the charge, a Commissioner should
be required to file a separate charge alleging the newly discovered
kind of discrimination. 7 This new filing would reinitiate procedures
resulting in notice to the respondent that he was also being investi-
gated for a different kind of discrimination. The respondent would
then be afforded the opportunity to comment upon and to settle
voluntarily the new charge prior to a reasonable cause determination
on that charge. 8
The Fourth Circuit rejected the latter argument, determining that
to require the EEOC to suspend investigation of a newly discovered
kind of discrimination, pending the filing of a Commissioner's charge,
would create a needless procedural technicality resulting in waste of
administrative resources and delay in the enforcement of individual
rights. 9 Furthermore, the court concluded that even if such proce-
3' 532 F.2d at 368-69. See EEOC v. Airguide Corp., 539 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1976).
3 Any member of the Commission can file a charge against a respondent. Such a
charge has the same procedural effects as an individual's charge. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-
5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
See note 35 supra.
532 F.2d at 365; EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir.
1976) (adopting the reasoning and language of the Fourth Circuit in General Electric).
See EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153, 157 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 946 (1975) (EEOC not required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975),
to file suit within 180 days after receipt of the charge, where the court stated that to
require continual refiling of charge every 180 days would result in disruption of pro-
ceedings and serve no useful purpose).
Conflicting public and private interests create a tension between methods of en-
forcing Title VII. The Fourth Circuit has recognized that private complaints are inter-
ested in securing speedy vindication of individual rights in court, but that public policy
goals are better served by the EEOC securing voluntary compliance with the Act
through conciliation, a process which is often time-consuming. Johnson v. Seaboard
Airline R. Co., 405 F.2d 645, 651 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969). In
discrimination cases, however, the wrongs alleged, if true, have gone too long unreme-
died, and thus may require the fastest action possible. EEOC v. Local No. 41, Barten-
ders Int'l Union, 369 F. Supp. 827, 831 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The Fourth Circuit's holding
in General Electric balances the competing interests by approving expedition of the
process designed to secure voluntary compliance with Title VII. General Electric is
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dures are required, failure to comply with the procedures should not
necessarily result in automatic dismissal of a claim raising issues
concerning newly discovered kinds of discrimination. Dismissal is
appropriate only when the failure results in substantial prejudice to
the party entitled to compliance with the procedure. 0 The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that a respondent does not normally suffer substan-
tial prejudice when the EEOC fails to afford him an opportunity to
comment on an additional claim of discrimination uncovered during
investigation of a charge not raising that particular claim.4' The
EEOC has no adjudicatory powers, and thus cannot make decisions
or enter into agreements which bind the respondent without his con-
sent. 2 Instead, the EEOC has power merely to attempt voluntary
analogous to cases holding that an individual is not required to file a new charge with
the EEOC every time an investigation of his original charge uncovers additional acts
or kinds of discrimination. See, e.g., Gamble v. Birminghan S.R. Co., 514 F.2d 678 (5th
Cir. 1975); Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973).
Cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972) (to require individual to file second charge
with EEOC after first charge was deferred to state agency would create needless proce-
dural technicality).
10 532 F.2d at 370; EEOC v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 992 (1975); Hunter & Clark, supra note 28 at 568. Cf. American
Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970). (Interstate Commerce
Commission may construe its own procedures liberally unless party entitled to compli-
ance with the rule is thereby substantially prejudiced). Strict compliance with proce-
dures is typically required of any agency only when the agency has adjudicative pow-
ers, or when failure to observe a procedure might subject a party before the agency to
liability in court. See United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1970) (failure of
Internal Revenue Service agent to follow agency rules resulted in evidence which might
have subjected the party under investigation to substantial liability in court). See
generally Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 HAv. L. REv. 629
(1974).
" 532 F.2d at 370-71.
42 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1974); Fekete v. United
States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 336 (3d Cir. 1970). An amendment granting the
EEOC power to issue cease-and-desist orders was rejected by Congress. 118 CONG. REc.
§ 562 (Jan. 24, 1972). Other proposals to grant the EEOC adjudicative powers were
also rejected. Additional Majority Views of Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier on H.R. 7152,
reprinted in [1964] U.S.CoDE. CONG. & AD. NEws 2411. See generally Sape & Hart,
note 19 supra, at 836-46.
In General Electric, the company broached an additional argument why substan-
tial prejudice would result if the sex discrimination claim was allowed. The company
argued that if it were found to have discriminated, it would be liable to female employ-
ees and job applicants for back pay awards covering the two years prior to the date
the original charge was filed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). The court rejected
this argument, stating that if the company were found liable the district court could
limit the back pay award so that it covered the two years prior to the reasonable cause
determination, the date the company was notified of the EEOC's sex discrimination
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conciliation of discrimination claims.43 During conciliation discus-
sions the respondent may make a full presentation of his position
with respect to any such claim.4 If these discussions fail, the respon-
dent again has the opportunity to make a full presentation of his case
in a trial de novo in district court.45 The Fourth Circuit found that
because General Electric had the opportunity in conciliation discus-
sions to present its position concerning the claim of sexual discrimi-
nation, and would still have that opportunity in district court, the
company would not suffer substantial prejudice if the claim were
allowed to stand.46
Judge Widener, however, dissented from the holding that dis-
missal of the sexual discrimination claim was not justified by the
EEOC's failure to comply with procedures requiring that General
Electric be allowed to comment on the charge of sexual discrimina-
tion. He concluded that the company had suffered prejudice as a
result of that failure.47 The company was denied an opportunity to
settle voluntarily the claim of sexual discrimination 8 and thus avert
suit on that issue because it was unable to make an effective presen-
tation of its position prior to the reasonable cause determination.
Furthermore, truly voluntary compliance with Title VII was impossi-
ble once the reasonable cause determination was made because the
company then was forced to bargain while aware that failure to con-
ciliate would almost inevitably result in the instigation of a civil suit
raising claims of sexual discrimination. The threat of possible suit,
however, is the catalyst which induces the respondent to attempt to
conciliate and comply voluntarily with Title VII.5' Absent the threat
claims. 532 F.2d at 372. For a discussion of back pay awards, see text accompanying
notes 73-92 infra.
"' See text accompanying notes 9 & 42 supra; text accompanying notes 52-53
infra.
" See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973).
" Nothing said or done in conciliation discussions may be admitted into evidence
at trial without the consent of the parties. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975); 29
C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1975).
' 532 F.2d at 371.
4 Id. at 376 (Widener, J., dissenting).
" See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19a (1975).
532 F.2d at 376 (Widener, J., dissenting).
SId.
5' The EEOC has recognized the importance of the threat of suit as a consideration
in conciliation discussions: "Central to the concept of conciliation is the right of the
Commission . . . to bring a civil action . . . when the Commission has been unable
to secure from the respondent a Conciliation Agreement acceptable to the Commis-
sion." EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1224 (1976).
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of civil enforcement, the respondent would neither benefit from a
conciliation agreement nor suffer from failure to reach such agree-
ment. Furthermore, conciliation, not mere voluntary compliance, is
the focal point of the statutory process designed to eliminate employ-
ment practices unlawful under Title V]1.
5
1
The Fourth Circuit emphasized the importance of conciliation by
limiting the scope of the EEOC complaint to claims which were the
subject of conciliation attempts. Thus the holding in General Electric
has two principal points of significance. On the one hand, the holding
equates the EEOC's ability to raise issues in its civil complaint with
the EEOC's broad ability to investigate issues reasonably related to
an original charge filed with the Commission. On the other hand,
issues cannot be raised in the complaint which were not the subject
of conciliation attempts. Consequently, the respondent is guaranteed
an opportunity during conciliation discussions to resolve voluntarily
any claim of employment discrimination before that claim may be
raised against him in a civil suit.53
Termination of Conciliation Discussions Before Suit
If the EEOC terminates conciliation discussions because the re-
spondent fails or refuses to make a good faith effort' to resolve a dis-
Under Title VII as originally enacted the EEOC could not bring a civil suit. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970). The statute was criticized as denying to the EEOC the power
to exert formal pressure in the form of a threat of civil action to lend effect to the
Commission's efforts to secure voluhtary compliance with Title VII. Berg, Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62,
67, 97 (1965); Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 430, 435-36 (1965). Because the EEOC could not sue,
conciliation efforts were often ineffective. Employers were not deterred from violating
Title VII by the threat of individual suits, and often refused to comply voluntarily with
the provisions of the Act. Sape & Hart, supra note 19, at 825.
52 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50, 72 (1975); EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 507 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1974); EEOC
v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1336 (D. Del. 1974), af'd, 516
F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975); Latino v. Rainbo Bakers, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 870 (D. Col.
1973).
- Although failure to afford a respondent an opportunity to comment on a partic-
ular claim of discrimination will seldom justify dismissal of a suit, failure to allow the
respondent an effective opportunity to conciliate does result in prejudice. EEOC v.
United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 247 (N.D. Ala. 1974); EEOC v.
Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974). See EEOC v. Airguide Corp.,, 539
F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1976). That such prejudice justifies dismissal of the EEOC suit
indicates the importance of conciliation as a means for securing compliance with Title
VII. See cases cited note 52 supra; Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 62, 85-86 (1965).
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pute concerning discrimination, the EEOC is required to notify the
respondent that the discussions have been unsuccessful and will not
be resumed except upon respondent's written request.5' In EEOC v.
Raymond Metal Products Co.,5 the Fourth Circuit was presented
with the question whether the EEOC's failure to comply with the
exact provisions of this procedural regulation was ground for dis-
missal of the Commission's complaint. In Raymond Metal, the com-
pany's persistent refusal to engage in conciliation discussions with
the Commission caused the EEOC to terminate such attempts. The
Commission notified the company it was ceasing its attempts to con-
ciliate, but neglected to include in its letter any indication that such
attempts would not be resumed unless the company so requested.'
The letter did indicate, however, that the original charging individual
had been informed that he could request a letter notifying him of his
right to sue. 5 The EEOC subsequently filed suit.
The Fourth Circuit held that the failure of the EEOC to inform
the respondent that he might request a resumption of conciliation
discussions did not justify dismissal of the complaint where the re-
spondent had consistently refused conciliation attempts, and where
the letter notifying him of the termination of such attempts indicated
that the respondent might later be sued. 8 The court indicated, how-
ever, that prejudice to the employer resulting from the EEOC's non-
compliance with the regulation might justify dismissal of the com-
plaint. 9
51 29 C.F.R. § 1601.23 (1975). This regulation has been characterized as offering a
recalcitrant employer one last chance to conciliate. EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 366 F. Supp. 273, 276 (D. Md. 1973).
530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 596.
" Id. at 596 n.15. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.23 (1975).
530 F.2d at 596. See EEOC v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 505 F.2d 610 (5th Cir.
1974). The Eighth Circuit has subsequently adopted the reasoning of the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Raymond Metal. In EEOC v. Laclede Gas. Co., 530 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1976),
the letter informed the respondent that conciliation discussions had been terminated
and indicated that the case was being forwarded to the EEOC's General Counsel to
evaluate the possibility of litigation. The Laclede Gas court held that because the
letter indicated that the EEOC might sue the company, the EEOC's failure to notify
the company that it could request a resumption of conciliation discussions did not
prejudice the company. Id. at 284.
11 Because the district court made no finding that Raymond Metal had been
prejudiced, the Fourth Circuit did not consider what showing the company must make
to indicate prejudice. Other courts have held in similar circumstances that a showing
that the notification has left a respondent unaware a civil suit might be brought
against him is a showing of prejudice sufficient to justify dismissal of the suit. EEOC
v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 507 F.2d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Western Elec. Co.,
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The company also argued that alternative grounds justified dis-
missal of the suit. The reasonable cause determination, a prerequisite
for a suit by the EEOC, 0 was made by an EEOC District Director in
Raymond Metal."' The company argued, however, that a reasonable
cause determination by the Commission itself was required by stat-
ute.2 Consequently, the reasonable cause determination by the Dis-
trict Director was ineffective and did not satisfy the prerequisite for
suit.,
The Fourth Circuit disagreed. The court determined that the
power to make a reasonable cause determination is procedural be-
cause it prescribes the methods by which the EEOC acts, and does
not involve resolution of the rights of persons involved in nonjudicial
proceedings under Title VII.11 The power to issue a reasonable cause
382 F. Supp. 787, 797 (D. Md. 1974). Cf. EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc.,
503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974) (succeeding employer deemed not entitled to new notice
where he knew conciliation attempts with former employer had failed and suit against
company might be forthcoming).
A comparison of the showing necessary to indicate prejudice under General
Electric with the showing required in cases similar to Raymond Metal reveals a prevail-
ing concern for the conciliation process. Under General Electric standards, failure to
file a charge alleging a particular kind of discrimination will result in prejudice only if
that kind of discrimination is not the subject of conciliation efforts. See text accompa-
nying note 53 supra. Under standards evolved in cases similar to Raymond Metal, the
respondent will not suffer prejudice unless he is deprived of a last chance to conciliate
as a result of his being sued without first being notified that a civil suit is imminent.
These requirements reinforce the concept of conciliation as the most important process
designed to secure compliance with Title VII. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
"1 EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 993 (D. Md. 1974); EEOC v. Local
No. 41, Bartenders Int'l Union, 369 F. Supp. 827, 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973); EEOC v. Pick-
Memphis Corp., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8471 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE
(CCH) 2138 (1976).
"1 District Directors are in charge of offices which the EEOC has established in
defined geographical areas. These offices have been delegated the power to receive,
process, and investigate charges, issue subpoenas, make reasonable cause determina-
tions, attempt conciliations, enter into voluntary settlement agreements, and to issue
letters notifying individuals of their right to sue. 1 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) $ 1911
(1976). The term "Commission", for the purpose of the procedural regulations, is
defined as meaning the EEOC or any of its designated representatives. 29 C.F.R. §
1601.3 (1975).
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975), provides in pertinent part that "[ilf
the Commission determines .. .that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true, the Commission shall [attempt to secure voluntary compliance]."
530 F.2d at 593.
" Id. at 593-95. A reasonable cause determination is merely a determination that,
if conciliation is unsuccessful, a civil suit probably should be instituted. EEOC v. Avon
Products, Inc., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,731 at 7036 (N.D. Ga. 1975). Issuing a reason-
able cause determination does not involve resolution of the rights of parties before the
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determination is thus delegable under the broad authority of the
EEOC to develop its own procedural rules. 5 The Fourth Circuit also
rejected the argument that delegation of the power to make reason-
able cause determinations was, in effect, a delegation of the EEOC's
power to sue, because the Commission reviews and approves every
suit brought under its name."
Commission because the EEOC has no adjudicative powers. Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516
F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1975). If conciliation fails, each party has the opportunity to
present his side of the case in a trial de novo in the district court. See Chandler v.
Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 844-45 (1976). Furthermore, the EEOC, in effect, reviews
the reasonable cause determination in making its decision whether to bring suit. See
text accompanying note 66 infra. Thus, the power to issue reasonable cause determina-
tions is delegable. See Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137 (1971) (NLRB
can delegate power to determine the labor unit appropriate for collective bargaining
within a company). Cf. United States v. Cottman Co., 190 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 903 (1952) (Secretary of the Treasury has broad responsibilities
of highest character and is not required personally to conduct hearings in every case
where customs Officer has assessed duties). See generally 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATrIs § 9.01 (3d ed. 1972).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1970). The Eighth Circuit, subsequent to the decision in
Raymond Metal, was faced with an identical challenge to the authority of the EEOC
to delegate its powers, and adopted the reasoning and language of the Fourth Circuit
in Raymond Metal. EEOC v. Laclede Gas Co., 530 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1976). In an
analogous context concerning the National Labor Relations Board, the Supreme Court
held that broad rule-making power itself may be sufficient authority to delegate a
particular function. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 121
(1947).
Congress expanded the enforcement powers of the Commission in part to enable
the EEOC to handle more effectively a steadily increasing number of charges filed each
year. In 1969 the EEOC received 12,148 charges. In the first seven months of 1972 the
EEOC received 14,644 charges. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1971),
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2139. By 1975 the number of
charges filed with the EEOC had swelled to an estimated 106,700. Report of EEOC
Chairman Peary to Senate Labor Committee, reprinted in 197 B N A DAILY LAB. REP.
SpEc. Supp., 12-13 (Oct. 9, 1975), cited in Smith, Economic Pressure in Support of
Unlawful Employment Discrimination Claims, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 368, 368n.2 (1976).
These statistics indicate that to require the Commission itself to review investiga-
tions and make every reasonable cause determination would result in administrative
waste and delay. 530 F.2d at 594. The EEOC's situation neatly falls within a general
characterization of agencies that Commissioners "are not provided with a staff of five
hundred or a thousand or two thousand and then expected to take all action without
delegation." 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.01, at 215 (3d ed. 1972). Cf.
Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137 (1971) (NLRB can delegate to regional
directors power to make final decisions in labor cases, which decisions are not necessar-
ily subject to review by the Board).
'5 The EEOC must give final authorization for all suits brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 10,025 (1976).
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In Raymond Metal, the Fourth Circuit became the first court of
appeals to consider whether the power to issue reasonable cause de-
terminations is delegable."7 The court's decision that the power is
delegable accords with the trend of federal courts to permit delega-
tion of agency powers where those powers involve the methods by
which parties are brought before the agency. 8 The court's other hold-
ing"9 in Raymond Metal concerning the EEOC's violation of its rules
is especially significant when compared with the procedural holding
in General Electric.7" Such a comparison indicates that the Fourth
Circuit will not allow dismissal of a suit or claim because the EEOC
violates its own regulations unless the violation results in substantial
prejudice to the respondent.7 Thus, the Fourth Circuit will be reluc-
tant to erect technical barriers to suits, thereby impeding fulfillment
of the national policy aimed at eliminating employment discrimina-
tion.
The Awarding of Back Pay in a Class-Action Suit
Both General Electric and Raymond Metal involved questions
concerning what effect EEOC processing of charges has on whether
claims based on those charges can be raised in court. When the
EEOC complaint is filed, however, the district court begins adjudi-
cating the discrimination claims. If the respondent is found to have
engaged in discriminatory practices, the district court is empowered
to award appropriate remedies, including back pay and other equi-
'1 The only other cases in which the EEOC's delegation of powers has been an
issue involved questions concerning the exercise by staff members of the power to issue
letters notifying individuals of their right to sue. The principal issue involved in these
cases was not whether the power was delegable, but whether the power had actually
been delegated. Prior to May 21, 1973, the official EEOC manual containing tlie
directive delegating the power to issue the letters was unavailable to the public. Sev-
eral courts held this delegation invalid because it was not subject to public inspection
as required by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(c) (1970). See, e.g., Smith v. United Press Int'l, 8
Empl. Prac. Dec. 9512 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Stone v. Federal Corp., 351 F. Supp. 340
(N.D. Cal. 1972). Whether the delegation is valid is no longer an issue because on May
21, 1973, the official EEOC manual was made available to the public, and, subse-
quently, on August 15, 1973, the EEOC redelegated the power to issue the letters.
McDonald v. General Mills, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 24, 34-36 (E.D. Cal. 1974). See, Crouch
v. United Press Int'l, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,393 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Shaffield v.
Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
See 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATIsE § 9.01 (3d ed. 1973).
" See text accompanying note 58 supra.
7o See text accompanying note 13 supra.
" See text accompanying note 40-46 supra.
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table remedies.7 2 In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,7 3 the Supreme
Court enunciated the standard to be used to determine whether a
back pay award is appropriate: "Given a finding of unlawful discrimi-
nation, back pay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied
generally, would not frustrate the statutory purposes of eradicating
discrimination throughout the whole economy and making persons
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." This hold-
ing has been characterized as creating a presumption in favor of a
back pay award where a respondent is found to have engaged in
discriminatory practices.
75
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
73 422 U.S. 403 (1975). For analyses of Moody, see Note, Discrimination in
Employment-Remedies-Standards Governing Back Pay Awards for Violations of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 61 CORNE.LL L. REV. 460 (1976); Note, Civil Rights
- A Back Pay Award Standard: Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 54 N.C.L. REV. 196
(1976); Comment, Testing Standards and Back Pay Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 - In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 89 HARv. L. REV. 225 (1975).
" 422 U.S. at 421. The Supreme Court's decision vacated that of the Fourth
Circuit holding that back pay should generally be awarded in the absence of special
circumstances. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973),
vacated, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Other courts of appeals had applied standards identical
or similar to the Fourth Circuit's to detemine whether back pay should be awarded.
See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1376 (5th Cir. 1974) (back
pay should be awarded in the absence of "special circumstances"); Head v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 876 (6th Cir. 1973) (back pay should be awarded in
the absence of "exceptional circumstances"); Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
477 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1973) (back pay normally should be awarded); Sprogis v.
United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)
(back pay should normally be awarded). Several courts, however, held that the deci-
sion whether to award back pay was entirely within the discretion of the district courts.
Bryan v. Pittsburg Plat Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
900 (1975); Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1974).
Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 497 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied. 410 U.S. 908
(1975), provides an example of circumstances held as justifying the denial of back pay.
In Norman, the Eighth Circuit denied back pay because of the difficulty in ascertain-
ing an applicable standard to determine retrospectively whether any of the plaintiff
class members would have been able to qualify for promotion and higher pay. Id. at
597. Accord, United States v. St. Louis S. F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973). Most courts of appeals presented with the question,
however, have held that difficulty in calculating the amounts of back pay award does
not justify denying the award. See, e.g., Ford v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d
1043 (5th Cir. 1975); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975). The
difficulty in calculating back pay awards has been ameliorated by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provide for appointment of a special master to compute the
awards. FED. R. Civ. P. 53. See Note, Labor Law - Civil Rights Act - The Standard
for Awarding Back Pay in a Title VIIAction, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 466, 482 (1976).
11 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 786 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring
and dissenting). Even before Moody, at least one court found that Title VII created a
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In Local No. 974, United Transport. Union v. Norfolk & W. Ry. 8
a class action suit, the Fourth Circuit applied the Moody standard
in overturning a district court decision not to award back pay to
members of the plaintiff class.7 Prior to 1965, Norfolk & Western's
hiring practices resulted in the company's maintenance of two ra-
cially distinct and separate railroad yards located adjacently in Nor-
folk, Virginia. In an earlier decision in this case"8 on facts identical
to Local No. 974, the Fourth Circuit found Norfolk & Western to be
presumption in favor of back pay. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d
1361 (5th Cir. 1974).
7' 532 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1644 (1976).
7 Moody also held that a court of appeals should reverse a district court's denial
of back pay only when the lower court was clearly erroneous in its findings of law or
fact, or if the court had abused its discretion in denying back pay in view of the
circumstances of the case. 422 U.S. at 424. These are the general standards for appel-
late review of district court decisions. See Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931);
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975); rev'd on other grounds,
423 U.S. 946 (1976); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). The Local No. 974
court overturned the district court's decision not to award back pay on the ground that
the lower court made erroneous findings of law. See text accompanying notes 81-85
infra.
1' Rock v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 473 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
933 (1973). Rock contains a more detailed factual discussion of Norfolk and Western's
discriminatory practices.
Statistics are the evidence most frequently used in class action suits to show
discrimination against a class. 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 2330, at 1845 (1976).
When the suit concerns hiring or promotion practices, proof of a great disparity in
terms of percentages between the racial composition of a workforce and the racial
composition of a group of employees hired or promoted from that workforce is sufficient
to establish a prima facie case that discrimination has occurred. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 432 (1971); King v. Yellow Freight Syst., Inc., 523 F.2d 879 (8th
Cir. 1975); Barnet v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); NAACP v. Beecher,
504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); Afro American Patrolmens League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 1374
(6th Cir. 1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d (5th Cir. 1974);
Note, Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation: A Uni-
form Standard for Both Public and Private Employers, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505,
510 (1973).
Once the prima facie case is proved, the burden of proof shifts. The employer may
rebut the evidence of discrimination by showing that the employment practice in
question was essential to some legitimate business purpose, such as safety or efficiency.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805-06 (1973); Day v. Matthews, 530
F.2d 1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 316 (6th
Cir. 1975); Rock v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 473 F.2d 1344, 1348 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 933 (1973); United States v. St. Louis S. F. Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); Note, Testing for Special Skills in Employ-
ment: A New Approach to Judicial Review, 1976 DUKE L.J. 596, 598. For an analysis
of standards used to determine whether an employment practice is a business necess-
ity, see Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A
No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L. J. 98 (1974). If the employer is able to show that
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engaging in unlawful discriminatory employment practices by main-
taining separate seniority systems in the two yards, which systems
perpetuated the effects of past discriminatory practices." The CT
Yard was comprised predominantly of white employees, while the
Barney Yard was comprised predominantly of black employees.
Rates of pay for each job classification in either yard were identical,
but wider variances in work demanded from the Barney Yard sub-
jected the employees there to more frequent layoffs and to diminished
opportunities for promotion. Upon remand of the case for determina-
tion of remedies, the district court listed three principal reasons for
denying a back pay award: the disparities in total income between
the two yards were the result of personal choice on the part of Barney
Yard employees since few Barney Yard employees ever applied for
transfer to the CT Yard; rates of pay at the two yards were identical;
and, Norfolk & Western had earlier made good faith efforts to merge
the seniority rosters of the two yards, which efforts were prevented
by the union. 0
The Fourth Circuit rejected these reasons for denying back pay,
however, and held that proof that a class has suffered economic loss
as a result of discrimination is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case that the class is entitled to back pay."' Concerning personal
choice, the court emphasized that transfer to the CT Yard would
result in the Barney Yard employee losing his earned senioriiy credit,
and held that a refusal to commit "seniority suicide" is not an accept-
able reason for denying backpay s2 In disposing of the equal rates of
pay argument, the court reasoned that potentials for promotion and
layoffs were "terms and conditions" of employment." Because une-
qual terms and conditions of employment resulted in lower total in-
come for Barney Yard employees, the Fourth Circuit held that a
comparison of total income, and not rates of pay, should be the stan-
the practice in question has a business purpose, the claiming party is then given an
opportunity to prove that the business purpose is merely a pretense for discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
"' Rock v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 473 F.2d 1344, 1348 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 933 (1973).
532 F.2d at 339.
" Id. at 341.
K2 Id. Cf. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 316 (6th Cir. 1975) (under
policy where interdepartmental transfer and promotion results in loss of seniority
credits, failure to request transfers does not bar seniority remedy).
,3 Title VII proscribes an employer's discrimination with respect to "compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(Supp. V 1975). See Peters v. Missouri-Pac. R.R., 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1002 (1973) (requirement that blacks retire at an earlier age specifically held
to be discriminatory term and condition of employment).
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dard for determining whether a back pay award is justified.84
The court also rejected the argument that the company's good
faith efforts to merge the seniority rosters justified denial of back pay,
and applied the generally accepted doctrine that an employer's good
faith efforts to end discrimination do not constitute a defense to back
pay liability.8 A back pay award is remedial in nature and is designed
to compensate the victims of discrimination, not to punish the em-
ployer." Therefore, to be subject to back pay liability the employer
need not have engaged in an employment practice with the specific
intent to discriminate; instead, he must have intended merely to
engage in the employment practice." The union's frustration of Nor-
532 F.2d at 539-40.
The only cases in which an employer's good faith actions have been upheld as a
defense to back pay liability have been those wherein employers, relying on, state
female protecton laws, refused to cease discriminating against female employees.
Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. N. L.
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972). cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1973); Rosenfield v. Southern
Pac. R.R., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). State female protection laws are designed to
"protect" women workers, often by restricting the number of hours women may work,
or by excluding them from various jobs. See, e.g., Orno REv. CODE ANN. § § 4107.42,
.43, .46 (Page 1953); VA. CODE §§ 40.1-34-38 (1950) (repealed 1974). The Ohio statutes
were held invalid as in conflict with Title VII. Manning v. International Union, 466
F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972); Jones Metal Products Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St.2d 173, 281
N.E.2d 1 (1972).
5 Id. at 341-42; Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975); Carey
v. Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372, 1378 (5th Cir. 1974); Baxter v. Savannah Suger
Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 442 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Head v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 877 (6th Cir. 1973). See Comment,
Discrimination in Employment-Remedies-Standards Governing Back Pay Awards for
Violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 460, 466
(1976); Note, Civil Rights - A Backpay Award Standard: Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 54 N.C.L. REv. 196, 201 (1976).
" Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975); United States v.
Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 921 (5th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791, 804 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972); Note, Labor Law - Civil
Rights Act - The Standard for Awarding Back Pay in a Title VII Action, 12 WAKE
FOREsT L. REv. 466, 474 (1976).
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (Supp. V 1975) provides that the defendant may be held liable for back pay if
found to have "intentionally" engaged in an unlawful employment practice. Before
Moody, the majority of courts construed the statute to mean that if the defendant
intentionally engaged in the employment practice he could be held liable for back pay.
Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1973); Spurlock v.
United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218 (10th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791, 795 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972); Sprogis v.
United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
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folk & Western's attempts to merge the seniority rosters could not,
therefore, be used by the company as a shield to cover its own liabil-
ity. 8
Concluding that good faith is not a defense to back pay liability,
the Fourth Circuit proceeded to delineate the procedures the district
court should use in calculating the back pay award for the class
plaintiffs. 9 By proving that Norfolk & Western engaged in discrimi-
natory practices, the plaintiffs raised a presumption that the class
was entitled to an award of back pay." However, only the members
of the class who were actual victims of discriminatory employment
practices should share in the award.'
Therefore, each member of the class seeking back pay must prove
that he is a member of the class seeking relief, and prove his income
for the years for which back pay is to be awarded.2 The employer may
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 1674
(1969). Several courts, however, required that the defendant be found to have engaged
in the employment practice with a specific intent to discriminate before he could be
held liable for back pay. See, e.g., Watkins v. Local No. 2369, United Steel Workers,
516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local No. 327, Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372, 1378 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fourth
Circuit in Local No. 979 indicated, however, that the union's resistance to the efforts
to merge the seniority rosters might be sufficient justification to shift at least part of
the back pay liability to the union. 532 F.2d at 342. Accord, Sabala v. Western Gillette,
Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975).
" 532 F.2d at 341.
," See text accompanying note 78 supra.
" Davidson, "Back Pay" Awards Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
26 RUT.ERs L. REV. 741, 743 (1973); Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy in Title VII Class
Actions: Problems of Procedure, 8 GA. L. REv. 781, 794 (1974); Fiss, A Theory of Fair
Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 307 (1971); Comment, Discrimination in
Employment-Remedies-Standards Governing Back Pay Awards for Violations of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 460, 464, 476 (1976).
91 532 F.2d at 341. The Fifth Circuit has stated that the most a member of the
plaintiff class should have to prove to be entitled to back pay is his current position
and rate of pay, the jobs he applied for and was denied despite his qualifications, and
a record of his employment history with the employer. Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 259 (5th Cir. 1974). Such a showing is more extensive than the
showing required by the Fourth Circuit, that the claimant prove he is a member of
the class and prove his income over the period convered by the award. The same
evidence, however, necessarily would be considered in determining the exact amount
of back pay awarded to the class member. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
A more extensive burden of proof is required of an individual plaintiff before he
is adjudged entitled to back pay. Because the individual plaintiff does not have the
benefit of a presumption of class-wide entitlement to back pay, he must prove that he
applied for a job or promotion; that despite his qualifications he was rejected; and that
the job was subsequently filled by a person not a member of a racial minority, McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Note, Labor Law-Civil
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then rebut the evidence that the individual is entitled to an award
of back pay by proving that the individual was denied promotion for
a legitimate business purpose, or because he was unqualified for pro-
motion." If the individual is found to be entitled to an award of back
pay, the amount of the award will be the difference between the
amount of pay actually earned and the amount of pay he would have
earned but for discrimination.
The award of back pay alone in Local No. 974, however, would be
insufficient to compensate the victims of Norfolk & Western's past
discriminatory hiring practices. Left unaltered, the dual seniority
systems would perpetuate the effects of the past discriminatory hir-
ing practices. The Barney Yard employees who were victims of dis-
Rights Act of 1964-Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rsv. 654 (1974).
" The shifting of the burdens of proof is identical to that discussed in note 77
supra.
" Section 2000e-5(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975), provides in pertinent
part that "[i]nterim earnings or amounts eamable with reasonable diligence by the
person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise
allowable."
The procedures delineated by the Fourth Circuit institute what is termed a bifur-
cated trial system for determining back pay awards in class action suits. United States
v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1042, 1053 (5th Cir. 1975). The system is
designed to reduce difficulties in calculating the awards and to alleviate problems with
the notice requirements for class action suits under FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See Edwards,
The Back Pay Remedy in Title VII Cases: Problems of Procedure, 8 GA. L. Rav. 781
(1974). See also Note, Civil Procedure-Class Action Suits - Class Wide Awards of Back
Pay in Suits Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 35 OHIO STATE L.J. 1027
(1974); Note The Tentative Settlement Class and Class Action Suits Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 72 MICH L. Rav. 1462 (1974).
At least one commentator has argued that the principal purpose of Title VII is to
insure equal employment treatment for minorities, emphasizing that victims of dis-
crimination should be compensated because they are victims, not because they are
members of a racial minority. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L.
REv. 235, 307-08 (1971). The Fourth Circuit's procedures for calculating the back pay
award reflect the concern that only the victim of discrimination be compensated, and
then only to the extent necessary to remedy his economic injury. See text accompany-
ing notes 92-93 supra. Perhaps a better, but more complex method to ensure this result
in most cases would require use of sophisticated statistical analysis. The goal of such
analysis would be a more precise calculation of what effect the racial characteristic had
in complex employment decisions, which could be used to adjust the back pay award
to reflect the exact effect the racial characteristic actually had. See Note, Beyond the
Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal,
89 HARv. L. REv. 387 (1975). It would be unnecessary to extend such analysis in a case
like Local No. 974, where it obviously was the racial characteristic which caused blacks
to be systematically excluded from the CT Yard. See text accompanying notes 78-79
supra.
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crimination would be constructively prevented from transferring to
take advantage of the greater opportunities for promotion available
in the CT Yard, because transfer would cause them to relinquish their
seniority credits. 5 As a result, the Barney Yard employees would
remain in that yard, still subject to impediments to promotion and
to the greater possibility of layoffs. To prevent this eventuality, ad-
justments in the seniority systems were ordered."
"5 The requirement that seniority credits be relinquished upon transfer would
cause the former Barney Yard employee to begin in the CT Yard with no seniority
credit. He would thus be put in the position of a newly-hired employee, again subject
to the greater possibility of being laid off and another long wait for a promotion. See
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 767 (1976).
" The necessity for seniority adjustments was recognized in the earlier Norfolk &
Western case, where the Fourth Circuit emphasized that such adjustments were
needed to eliminate the present effects of past discriminatory practices. Rock v. Nor-
folk & W. Ry. Co., 473 F.2d 1344, 1348 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 993 (1973).
Initially there was controversy over whether Title VII permitted the courts to order
adjustments in seniority systems where discriminatory hiring, transfer, or promotion
practices were terminated before the effective date of the Act. See Blumerosen,
Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RuTGERs L.
REV. 268 (1968). Title VII applied only to practices occurring after the effective date
of the Act. Love v. Pullman Co., 430 F.2d 49, 57 (10th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 522 (1972). Bona fide seniority systems were expressly protected
under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). Furthermore, the legislative history of
that section indicated that seniority systems were virtually sacrosanct. The Interpreta-
tive Memorandum of Senators Clark and Case, floor managers of the Civil Rights Bill,
explicitly stated that under Title VII an employer would not be obliged to "fire whites
in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes
are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired
earlier." 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964). To clarify and codify this intent, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(h) (1970) was added. 110 CONG. REc. 12,723 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hum-
phrey). See generally Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV.
431 (1966).
Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968), was the first case
in which seniority adjustments were ordered. Prior to the effective date of the Act,
Phillip Morris hired minority workers only into departments comprised of lower-paying
jobs. Transfer to better departments subsequent to the effective date of the Act was
discouraged because the minority worker was forced to relinquish his seniority credit
if he transferred. Adjustments were ordered to allow less restrictive transfer and pro-
motion policies based on criteria other than departmental seniority. The court found
that Title VII permits adjustments in seniority systems when they perpetuate the
effects of past discrimination, and stated that the Act "condemns . . . all racial dis-
crimination affecting employment, without excluding present discrimination that orig-
inated in seniority systems devised before the effective date of the act." Id. at 515. The
implication of the holding in Quarles is that the past and present are inextricable, and,
thus, a present practice reflecting past discrimination is a present violation of Title
VII. Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its
Implications, 47 TEx. L. Rav. 1039, 1047 n.41 (1969). The theory that a departmental
7 FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
The district court ordered that the seniority rosters of the two
yards be merged, with the date of hiring determining relative senior-
ity between the brakemen and between the conductors in the two
yards. The plaintiff class appealed the decision concerning conduc-
seniority system can be adjusted where it perpetuates the effects of past discriminatory
practices is now generally accepted. Zugschwerdt, Remedies Granted in Employment
Discrimination Cases, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTuNITY-RESPoNsiBILrIEs, RIGHTS,
REMEDIES, 239, 278 (J. Pemberton ed. 1975). See Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528
F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1668 (1976); Thornton v. East Texas
Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Local No. 189, United Paperworkers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Poplin, Fair Employment
in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 23 U.S.L.A. L. REv. 197 (1975).
Whether a plant-wide seniority system can be adjusted because it perpetuates the
effects of past discrimination is an unsettled issue. In Local No. 189, United Papermak-
ers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988-90, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), one of the earlier departmental seniority cases, the
court stated that departmental seniority systems can be adjusted if they perpetuate
the effects of past discrimination, but not plant-wide seniority systems. The Third
Circuit recently held that evidence showing that a plant-wide seniority system perpet-
uates the effects of past discrimination is inadmissible unless plaintiffs first prove that
the system, valid on its face, disguises an intent to discriminate. Jersey Cent. Power
& Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 706 (3d Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 425
U.S. 998 (1976). Cf. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974)
(despite fact that employee hired in 1964 was denied job in 1957, employee is not
entitled to seniority credit sufficient to prevent his layoff because plant-wide seniority
system requiring layoffs on last-hired, first-fired basis did not perpetuate effects of past
discriminatory hiring practices). Jersey Central has been characterized as unquali-
fiedly exempting plant-wide seniority systems from adjustments in Title VII discrimi-
nation cases. Note, Civil Rights - Title VII - Employee Security - Layoffs - Jersey Cent.
Power & Light v. Local 327, IBEW, 14 DuQ. L. Rxv. 475, 491 (1976). The opposing view
is that plant-wide seniority systems can be adjusted where the systems perpetuate the
effects of past discrimination. Proponents of this view advocate that the employee
should receive seniority credit dating from the time his application for employment
was rejected, provided that his rejection was discriminatory. Watkins v. Local No.
2369, United Steel Workers, 516 F.2d 41, 44 (5th Cir. 1975); Note, Last Hired and First
Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1544, 1556, 1570 (1975).
Recently the Fourth Circuit found occasion to order an adjustment in a plant-wide
seniority system. In Nance v. Union Carbide Co., 540 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1976), the
company had hired females only for certain jobs. The female complainant contended
that such limited hiring restricted her opportunities to bid on an equal basis with male
employees for job vacancies and that, as a result, she suffered five layoffs prior to the
effective date of Title VII. These layoffs reduced her company service seniority, causing
her to be laid off in 1970 prior to male employees with seniority less than she would
have had but for her previous layoffs. The Fourth Circuit held that the seniority system
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination, and that she was thus entitled to com-
pany service seniority comparable to that she would already have but for discrimina-
tion. Id. at 728-30.
11 The term "seniority" as used here includes both "benefit" and "competitive"
seniority. These terms are defined in note 103 infra.
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tors, contending that such a readjustment would preserve the present
effects of past discrimination practiced with respect to two classes of
Barney Yard employees. The first class would consist of employees
hired before March 18, 1956 who have been promoted to conductor.98
The second class would consist of brakemen hired between that date
and September 18, 1963 who have never had the chance to be pro-
moted to conductor.99 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the plaintiff
class, and ruled that date of employment as brakeman should deter-
mine relative seniority between these classes of Barney Yard employ-
ees and their counterparts in the CT Yard."9
By choosing this remedy, the court implicitly accepted the
"rightful place" theory for formulating remedies for employment dis-
" All CT Yard and Barney Yard brakemen hired before March 18, 1956, had had
the opportunity to be promoted to conductor. In the CT Yard, however, these oppor-
tunities came earlier than in the Barney Yard. 532 F.2d 340, 342-43.
99 All CT Yard brakemen hired before September 18, 1963 had the opportunity to
be promoted to conductor, but not all Barney Yard brakemen hired before that date
were afforded the same opportunity. Id. at 342-43.
101 The remedy was designed to put Barney Yard conductors and potential conduc-
tors on an equal footing with their CT Yard counterparts having equal length of
company service. For example, assume that a CT Yard employee and a Barney Yard
employee were hired on the same date. Each was qualified for promotion to conductor,
but the CT Yard employee was promoted to conductor first. Under the remedy provid-
ing that each employee be ranked according to company-service seniority, the Barney
Yard employee would compete on an equal basis with the CT Yard employee for the
next CT Yard vacancy.
Local No. 974 is analogous to cases involving departmental seniority systems. In
those cases minority workers were hired into inferior departments and discouraged
from transferring to other departments because transfer resulted in loss of seniority
credits. See note 96 and cases cited therein supra. The Barney Yard is the counterpart
of the inferior departments in those cases. Thus, the remedy allowing transfer with
retention of seniority credit from the Barney Yard to the CT Yard is similar to the
remedies granted in the departmental seniority cases. See, e.g., United States v.
T.I.M.E., Inc., 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791
(4th Cir. 1971).
Four months before the decision in Local No. 974, the Fourth Circuit decided
Williams v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 530 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1974). Williams was an individual
action by two plaintiffs arising out of the 1959 merger of the Norfolk & Western and
the Virginian railroads. The Virginian also operated racially separate and distinct
railroad yards. As part of the merger agreement, white employees of the Virginian were
allowed to carry over to the CT Yard seniority as of the date they were hired by the
Virginian. Black employees, however, were assigned to the Barney Yard. For substan-
tially the same reasons as in Local No. 974, the Fourth Circuit held that Norfolk &
Western discriminated against the plaintiffs by maintaining a seniority system which
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to
back pay and competitive and benefit seniority commensurate with that of their CT
Yard counterparts. Id. at 542-43.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
crimination.'0' This theory dictates that in employment discrimina-
tion cases remedies should be devised to secure for the victim of
discrimination the economic position he would already be occupying
but for discrimination.0 Under this theory, the victim of seniority-
related discrimination is accorded "benefit seniority" commensurate
with that of the employee holding the job the victim would have had
but for discrimination, and "competitive seniority" so that the victim
might compete on an equal basis with that same employee for future
job vacancies.' 3
The determination of the seniority remedy in class action suits is
governed by the same procedures and allocations of the burden of
proof as the determination of the back pay award."4 The plaintiff
class must prove the seniority system had discriminatory effects and
was engaged in intentionally. The burden then shifts to the party
advocating preservation of the system to show that it is essential to
a legitimate business purpose. If the seniority system is not proved
essential, the system may be adjusted to grant each member of the
class his "rightful place," dependent upon proof that he is qualified
"I The "rightful place" theory was first espoused in Note, Title VII, Seniority
Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HAav. L. Rav. 1260, 1266, (1967). It
became the principal theory behind seniority remedies after it was adopted by the
Fifth Circuit in Local No. 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980, 988-89 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
'" Thronton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416, 419-20 (6th Cir. 1974);
Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441. 540 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 661 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally Fiss, A Theory
of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235 (1971); Stacey, Title VII Seniority
Remedies in a Time of Economic Downturn, 28 VAD. L. Ray. 487 (1975); Note, Title
VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1260 (1967);
Comment, Title VII and Seniority Systems: Back to the Foot of the Line?, 64 Ky. L.J.
114 (1975).
"I "Benefit" seniority is seniority calculated to determine what amount of fringe
benefits the employee will receive. "Competitive" seniority is used in ranking prefer-
ence among applicants for future promotions. 1 EMPL. PRAc. Guma (CCH) 572 (1976).
Although court-ordered adjustments might disrupt seniority systems instituted as
a result of collective bargaining agreements, such adjustments are permitted because
of the strong national policy favoring the elimination of discrimination, and because
employees' promotional expectations under seniority systems are not "vested" inter-
ests. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 659 (2d Cir. 1971); Cooper & Sobol, Seniority
and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria
of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1598, 1605 (1969). Cf. Tilton v. Missouri
Pac. R. Co., 376 U.S. 169 (1964) (construing 50 U.S.C. §§ 459(C)(1), (2) (1970), which
provides that a re-employed returning veteran be granted the seniority credit he would
have received in his absence).
" See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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for the job he claims he would already be occupying but for
discrimination.
0 5
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Local No. 974 demonstrates the
correlation between back pay and seniority adjustment as remedies
for Title VII violations. Norfolk & Western's discriminatory hiring
practices, the effects of which were prepetuated in the seniority sys-
tems, were practices justifying the award of back pay. Nevertheless,
the award of back pay alone would be an insufficient remedy for the
victims of discrimination so long as the seniority systems, with their
discriminatory effects, were allowed to remain in effect.10a Therefore,
by ordering back pay and seniority adjustments, the Fourth Circuit
was able to secure for the victims a closer approximation of their
rightful economic positions.' 7
Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Local No. 974, the
Supreme Court decided Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.'°8 In
Franks, the Court found the company liable for back pay because it
had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices by excluding blacks
from jobs as "over-the-road" drivers and discouraging their transfer
to those positions. In overturning the Fifth Circuit's refusal to adjust
the seniority credit of the victims the Court held that the Moody
standard' °9 should apply to determine whether seniority adjustments
should be denied. The Court also emphasized that to award back pay,
but not to allow transfer with the seniority credits the victims would
have earned but for discrimination, would effectively deny the vic-
tims their rightful place in the economy."" The company, therefore,
was ordered to permit the members of the plaintiff class who had
been denied jobs as "over-the-road" drivers to be hired, or to transfer
to those jobs with seniority calculated from the date of their refusal.",
In Franks the Court affirmed the principle that seniority should
be adjusted in most circumstances to secure for the victim of employ-
ment discrimination an approximation of the economic position he
would be occupying but for discrimination.1 1 2 Thus the theory sup-
porting the seniority remedy in Local No. 974 was sanctioned in
Franks. "I
"5 See text accompanying note 93 supra.
c' 532 F.2d at 342-43. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-68
(1976).
"01 See generally Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
i10 Id.
IN See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
"' 424 U.S. at 764-68.
" Id. at 762-70.
112 Id.
113 See text accompanying notes 100-103 supra.
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"Bumping" and Front Pay Relief
In Patterson v. American Tobacco Co.,"'4 the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered two additional remedies which might be devised to grant the
victim his rightful economic position. The company and the union in
Patterson were found to have engaged in discriminatory promotion
practices. The company maintained separate branches within the
city of Richmond. Each branch had prefabrication and fabrication
departments. Blacks and females had been hired only into the prefa-
brication departments. Their promotional opportunities were limited
because of the systems the company used in determining which em-
ployees would be awarded promotions. These systems denied to
blacks and women the opportunity to advance through lines of pro-
gression"5 to higher paying jobs, or to transfer among branches or
departments without loss of seniority.' The district court ordered
elimination of the lines of progression system for determining promo-
tions, except where justified by business necessity."7 In its place, the
court ordered that length of company service be utilized in ranking
employees applying for promotions or transfer into the fabrication
department."8 The Fourth Circuit affirmed."' The Fourth Circuit,
however, overturned the district court's grant of an additional senior-
ity remedy allowing blacks and females to bump incumbent white
employees with less company-service seniority from preferred jobs in
the fabrication department.'10
The Fourth Circuit relied on the legislative history of Title VII and
its construction by other courts in deciding not to allow bumping.
The legislative history of Title VII indicates that the bumping of
white incumbents should not be utilized to eliminate the effects of
discrimination,' and it has been so construed by the courts of ap-
114 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3325 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1976)
(No. 76-46).
"I Under a lines of progression system for determining promotions an employee
must hold or have held a particular job before he will be considered for promotion to
the next higher quality, higher paying category of jobs. 1 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH)
602 (1976).
"' The system requiring that a transferring employee relinquish his seniority
credit is similar to the system in Local No. 974, where transfer would involve a victim's
starting in the new job with no seniority credit, and a seniority ranking behind that of
incumbent whites with less company service seniority. See text accompanying note 82
supra.
"1 535 F.2d at 264-65.
Id.
" Id. at 264.
' Id. at 267-68.
2 Comment, Employment Discrimination-The Use of the "Bumping" Remedy
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peals presented with the issue.' The Fourth Circuit also described
pragmatic reasons for disallowing bumping. First, one of the principal
goals of Title VII is to secure voluntary compliance with the Act by
employers and unions.'2 The court recognized that bumping incum-
bents from their jobs would create labor and management unrest and
possible resistance to efforts designed to eliminate employment dis-
crimination. 124 Second, because various business practices are being
recognized and redefined as having discriminatory effects, to allow
bumping would result in workers and businessmen having their work-
ing lives rearranged periodically by court decrees. 1' The Fourth Cir-
cuit also decided that bumping should not be allowed because a
different remedy could be devised for the victims which would effec-
tively place the victims in substantially the economic position they
would occupy as if bumping had occurred.'26 This remedy is the
prospective, or front pay award.2'
There is often a time-lag between the date of a back pay award
and the date the employee is promoted to his rightful economic posi-
tion. 1' During this time the employee's rate of pay remains the same
as it was before the court decision awarding back pay.29 The front pay
award is designed to grant to the employee the difference between his
prospective earnings at his current rate of pay until the date he is
expected to be promoted, and what he would earn until that date
were he promoted on the day of the court's judgment.30 In Patterson,
the Fourth Circuit became the first court of appeals to approve front
to Alleviate Effects of Past Sex and Race Discrimination, 28 RuTGERs L. Rav. 1285,
1299 (1975). See Interpretative Memorandum of Senators Case and Clark, 110 CONG.
REc. 7213 (1964). See also 110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964) (statement of Senator Clark);
110 Cong Rec. 7217 (1964) (answers of Senator Clark in response to questions of Sena-
tor Dirksen).
in EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 417 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
n Cf. text accompanying note 52 supra.
I 535 F.2d at 267-68. See Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on
Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEx. L. Rv. 1039, 1068 (1969); Comment,
Employment Discrimination-The Use of the "Bumping" Remedy to Alleviate Effects
of Past Sex and Race Discrimination, 28 RUTGES L. Ray. 1285, 1300-01 (1975).
in 535 F.2d at 267-68.
226 Id. at 269.
22 See generally Note, Front Pay-Prophylactic Relief Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 29 VAND. L. REv. 211, 212 (1976).
11 535 F.2d at 269.
In Note, Front Pay-Prophylactic Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 29 VAD. L. REv. 211, 212 (1976).
'3 Id. at 211.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
pay relief. 3' Several district courts, however, have awarded front pay,
using varying calculations to reach an award.' The Fourth Circuit
suggested two possible methods for calculating award. The first is
that the district court should estimate the amount of time it will take
the victim of discrimination to be promoted to his rightful position,
and award the present value of expected lost earnings within that
time period.' Alternatively, the court might exercise continuing ju-
risdiction over the case, requiring the victim to appear periodically
in court and prove his income. The court would then award the differ-
ence between actual income for the period under consideration and
the income the individual would have received but for discrimina-
tion. This process would continue until the employee was promoted
to his rightful place. 3 ' Whichever method is used, the benefit of the
front pay award is that it secures for the victim his rightful place in
"I The Fifth Circuit has held that the period for calculating compensatory awards
under Title VII should terminate on the date of the district court decree ordering back
pay. Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251, 1266 (5th Cir. 1975); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 258 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Second Circuit has recently cited Patterson in support of its holding that the
termination date of the back pay award should be the date that the discrimination is
actually remedied. EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, Local No. 638, 542 F.2d
579, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1976).
'3 One court, without specifying how the award was to be calculated, merely held
that the plaintiffs were to be compensated for future loss of earnings. Johnson v. Ryder
Truck Lines, Inc., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,692, at 6900 (W.D.N.C. 1975). Two courts
have awarded lump sums of 50 per cent of the total of average yearly differential
between the employee's current pay and the pay he would be earning but for discrimi-
nation, multiplied by the estimated number of years it will take the employee to reach
his rightful place. White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,470,
at 6020 (W.D.N.C. 1975); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp.
1045, 1060 (N.D.Ala. 1973), modified, 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975). One court has
ordered that the employee either be promoted to the position he would be occupying
but for discrimination, or be paid at the rate of pay for that position until he is so
promoted. Cross v. Board of Ed., 395 F. Supp. 531, 535 (E.D. Ark. 1975). Another court
has ordered that the individual be awarded the total differential between his current
pay and that he would be receiving but for discrimination for the estimated amount
of time it will take him to reach his rightful place. Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F.
Supp. 526, 538 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
'm 535 F.2d at 269.
'' One commentator has suggested that the best method for calculating front pay
would be to require the district court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over the case
and periodically reassess back pay awards. He argues that as a result the employer
would be provided with an incentive to promote the victims at a faster pace. Note,
Front Pay-Prophylactic Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 VAMD.
L. REv. 211, 226 (1976). Where promotion is made, however, strictly on the basis of
seniority among qualified applicants, the incentive to promote would not exist and the
present value method would serve as well.
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terms of probable compensation as if the white employee had been
bumped, and thus eliminates the factors which would indicate bump-
ing was necessary in the first instance.1' 5
The decisions of the Fourth Circuit in the past year indicate a
deep concern for the rights and economic position of the victims of
discriminatory employment practices prohibited by Title VII. The
procedures required under Title VII and prescribed by EEOC regula-
tions have been construed liberally by the court to remove procedural
technicalities restricting the access of victims and the Commission to
the federal courts. Furthermore, the court has demonstrated flexibil-
ity in designing remedies under Title VII. If the decision in Patterson
is indicative of the attitude of the Fourth Circuit in employment
discrimination cases, the court will not hesitate to fashion remedies
broadly designed to secure for the victim of employment discrimina-
tion his rightful place in the economy.
BENJAMIN G. PHmporr
B. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,1 (ADEA),
protects persons between the ages of forty and sixty-five,' whether
seeking employment or already working,3 from age discrimination.
The intent of the ADEA is to promote employment on the basis of
ability rather than age.' The protection is not limited to employers'
acts, since personnel agencies and other job procurement organiza-
tions are also within the ambit of the ADEA.5 In its first review of an
action brought under the Act, the Fourth Circuit defined the ADEA's
impact on advertisements for job opportunities.
In Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Service, Inc.' the Secretary of
Labor sought under the ADEA to enjoin the defendant personnel
" White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,470, at 6019
(W.D.N.C. 1975).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970)(amended 1974). See generally Note, Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment: Available Federal Relief, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 281
(1975).
2 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. V, 1975).
3 29 C.F.R. § 860.30 (1975).
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970). The congressional history and the intent of the Act
are summarized in Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974).
5 29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1970). See note 7 infra. 29 U.S.C. § 630(c) (1970) defines
employment agency as ". . . any person regularly undertaking with or without com-
pensation to procure employees for an employer and includes the agent of such a
person; but shall not include an agency of the United States."
- 529 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1975).
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agency from advertising in what he determined to be a discriminatory
manner. The defendant had used such terms as "recent college
grads," "girl," and "excellent first job" in newspaper advertisements,
contrary to the Department of Labor's reading of the statute., The
ADEA places emphasis on voluntary compliance and requires the
Secretary of Labor to attempt conciliation as a prerequisite to suit.8
Although five separate attempts at conciliation had failed, including
two with the president of Approved Personnel,' the district court
denied injunctive relief and held that the plaintiff had merely con-
fused the defendant agency and had not attempted compliance., The
Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the Secretary had fulfilled his
duty to conciliate and therefore the suit was not precluded."
The Fourth Circuit termed the conciliation effort, composed of the
five visits and an unspecified number of calls and letters, a patient
effort." Despite this effort and Approved Personnel's promised cessa-
tion, the defendant continued newspaper advertisements with the
same terms until the Department of Labor brought suit. The court
held that defendant's compliance after institution of the suit was not
dispositive of the discrimination claims, reasoning that an injunction
would not hinder future business if the defendant truly intended to
comply.,,
After declaring that suit was not precluded, the court turned to
the alleged violations. The court divided defendant's advertisements
into two groups: those soliciting inquiries about specific positions,
and those meant to acquaint a class of persons with the availability
of employment services. As to specific advertisements, the use of the
terms "recent college grads," "girls," and "career girls" was found to
7 29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer
for employment, or otherwise discriminate against, any individual
because of such individual's age, or to classify or refer for employment
any individual on the basis of such individual's age.
9 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1970).
529 F.2d at 762-63.
20 Id. at 763.
Id. at 764-65.
12 Id. at 764.
13 Id. An injunction would force defendant to discontinue the advertisements. The
burden, however, would be on defendant thereafter to show the absence of contempti-
ble behavior. Brennan v. Weis Mkts., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8519 (M.D. Pa.1973), held
that continued broken promises of an employer showed a sufficient conciliation effort
by the Department of Labor, because an opposite holding would allow an employer to
avoid suit indefinitely.
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violate both the intent of the ADEA and the statute. 4 These terms
imply that older persons need not apply for the jobs. In contrast, the
court found no such implication in the term "junior secretary," since
"junior" is descriptive of the job, not the age of the person to fill it. 5
Advertisements for positions denoted "first job" or "excellent first
job" did not discriminate, nor did proferred employment with a
"young office group" or for a "young executive." The court found only
that description of the working environment did not show preference
for youth in hiring. These informational or acquaintance advertise-
ments were subject to scrutiny, and could be justified only if they
were infrequent" and not directed to specific job opportunities.
Although deciding that certain terms violated Department of
Labor standards, the court did not explicitly define the permissibility
of these terms in a different context. Refusing to find certain terms
"trigger words," and thus per se violations, as urged by the Depart-
ment of Labor, the court suggested that context was the determina-
tive factor. 8 The court apparently allows subtle suggestion of prefer-
ence for young applicants by the use of connotative terms in the job
title, job description, or description of the employer, when the terms
appear to be denotative. 9 For example, in addressing the terms
"athletically inclined" and "All-American," the court found that
these qualities can exist in a person of any age and were therefore
permissible. This finding, however, conflicts with the finding that
terms such as "recent college grads" are violative, as there are recent
college graduates in every age group. The use of acquaintance adver-
tisements declaring a number of job openings for "recent grads" may
2, See notes 4 & 7 supra.
' 529 F.2d at 765. The court noted that the Department of Labor itself used those
terms, id. at 765 n.10, citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, I DIcrIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL
TrrLES: DEFINITION OF TrrLES 393 (3d ed. 1965).
11 The court noted that Approved Personnel made general appeals only in the
spring of the year, a time when the recipients of the appeal had the greatest need for
employment advice and counseling. 529 F.2d at 766 n.12.
" Id. at 766. Job descriptions in the plural may avoid illegality. See text accompa-
nying notes 19-20 infra.
" 529 F.2d at 765.
1 The kind of advertisement which, by subtle connotation, suggests that certain
persons need not apply is precisely the kind that discriminates on the basis of age. See
Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Available Federal Relief, 11 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 281, 305 (1975), citing Secretary of Labor, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTs ACT OF 1964, THE OLDER
AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965). The latter report led
to the enactment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. 11 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PRos., supra, at 305-06 n.122.
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allow an employment service to discriminate simply by making the
job offering plural so that the service complies by not offering specific
jobs in an informational advertisement. The plaintiff Department of
Labor suggested that, in fulfilling the congressional mandate,
whether the deterrent applies to one job or a multitude is irrelevant."0
Allowing acquaintance advertisements and the use of non-violative
words in a preferential context, the court has left avenues of potential
discrimination open to personnel agencies in their invitations to em-
ployment.
In another Fourth Circuit decision reviewing the ADEA, McMann
v. United Air Lines, Inc.,2' the court held that United's employee
benefit plan, which required retirement at age sixty, was proscribed
by the Act. United's plan, which McMann voluntarily joined, forced
his retirement at the employer-chosen age of sixty.2 The selection of
that age brought the plan within the ADEA.2 The Act, however,
exempts bona fide plans that do not evade the purposes of the Act.24
Although United's plan began before the passage of the ADEA,2 the
court held that maintenance of a forbidden subterfuge after enact-
ment of the ADEA was within the scope of review.
26
Considering the facts, the court held United's plan violative of the
Act unless defendant could prove some business purpose other than
arbitrary age discrimination.Y The Fourth Circuit, relying heavily on
" Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 15-16, Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Serv.,
Inc., 529 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1975).
21 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1977)
(No. 76-906).
2 Id." at 219. McMann's application, executed nine years before his retirement and
three years prior to the enactment of the ADEA, contained notice of the "normal
retirement age." An employee had no discretion whether to continue past this age.
United never allowed continued employment, forcing all employees to retire at age
sixty. Id.
The court did not mention the voluntariness of McMann's enrollment. By signing
the contract containing notice of the normal retirement age, he might have been said
to have accepted the age limit. In addition, his failure to complain until forced to retire
might have been taken as a waiver. However, the reach of the ADEA is remedial, and
thus is retrospective. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
z See notes 1-3 and accompanying text supra.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer. . . (2) to observe the terms
of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan
such as a retirement, pension or insurance plan, which is not a subter-
fuge to evade the purposes of this chapter.
2 The effective date of the ADEA was June 12, 1968. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
21 542 F.2d at 221.
2 Id. at 221-22.
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the legislative history of the ADEA for its conclusion, held that
United offered no justification for the plan sufficient under the Act.
Since United sought exemption only because its formulation of the
retirement plan predated the ADEA, and argued that it therefore
could not be a subterfuge, the court remanded" for inquiry into mo-
tives other than age discrimination.
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in Brennan v.
Taft Broadcasting Co. 0 refused to inquire into the legislative history
and relied solely on the "unambiguous language of the statute"'" to
hold that a retirement plan in existence before the ADEA's enact-
ment is excluded from review.2 Reasoning that attempts to override
the clear statutory language with legislative history have been
rejected by the Supreme Court,3" the Fifth Circuit upheld Taft Broad-
casting's right to force early retirement.
The two circuits conflict over the necessity or permissibility of
resort to legislative history in defining the intent of congressional
actions. The Supreme Court recently held that examination of legis-
lative history is appropriate, though not required, regardless of how
clear a statute may be on its face.34 Thus the Fourth Circuit's
approach is preferable. The court also was careful to limit the inquiry
to history consistent with the wording of the ADEA.35 Since the re-
view granted by the Fourth Circuit was based solely on United's
failure to demonstrate the business purpose of its plan, McMann does
not go far to illuminate the court's posture towards the ADEA, but
indicates only that it will utilize the legislative history in defining it.36
Id. at 222. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in [1967]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2213, 2217.
" 542 F.2d at 222.
500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
3 Id. at 217.
2 Id.
u See, e.g., Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65 (1963); NLRB v. Highland
Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951). But see Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner,
350 U.S. 46 (1955) (plain wording of tax statute ignored to further congressional in-
tent).
31 Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976),
reaffirming United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940).
11 542 F.2d at 221.
3' Because the language in McMann indicates that a business nexus would be a
bona fide plan not based upon arbitrary age discrimination, the Fourth Circuit would
presumably allow such a plan. The court indicated, however, that it will pay close
attention to the validity of the business nexus claim. Id.
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C. Racial Discrimination
Discharge of Minority Teacher: Standard of Proof of Lack of Discrim-
inatory Motive and Scope of Appellate Review
In 1966, the Fourth Circuit held in Chambers v. Hendersonville
City Board of Education' that a sudden reduction in the number of
black instructors raised a rebuttable inference of racial discrimina-
tion. The integration plan of the local school district had moved forty
percent of the black students to other school districts.2 Maintaining
the faculties of the newly integrated schools at a racial balance equiv-
alent to that of the students resulted in the discharge of approxi-
mately forty percent of the black teachers.3 The Chambers court held
that the inference that long-standing discrimination continues is re-
buttable only by clear and convincing evidence that discrimination
is not among the reasons for firing a teacher.' The court derived the
presumption from its conclusion that judicial action was necessary to
secure integration, and required defendant to carry the burden of
proof because most of the facts were in the defendant's power to
produce.'
The Fourth Circuit reviewed this standard of proof in a similar
situation ten years later in Jones v. Pitt County Board of Education.I
Plaintiff, a black, had taught seventh and eighth grades in an all-
black school for ten years, and received ratings of "average" on her
evaluations during that time. Upon integration of the school district
in 1970,1 she was assigned to teach fifth grade in a different facility.
Based upon poor evaluations by a supervisor and principal, both
white, Jones was not rehired for the 1972-73 school year. s Plaintiff
sought administrative review of her dismissal.
The Pactolus School Advisory Board, a panel of six whites and
three blacks, unanimously affirmed the principal's recommendation
364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966), noted in 45 N.C.L. Rev. 166 (1966).
2 364 F.2d at 190.
Id. The school principal "concluded that the Negro pupils should have 'adequate
representation at the teacher level'" Id.
Id. at 192. The court did not explain why the higher standard of proof was
necessary. The Fourth Circuit included in the Chambers decision an order requiring
the school district to formulate "definite objective standards for the employment and
retention of teachers," including standardized evaluation forms. Id. at 193.
Id. at 192.
£ 528 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1975).
The Pitt County, North Carolina, school system was integrated pursuant to
court order in Teel v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 272 F. Supp. 703 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
9 528 F.2d at 416.
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at a hearing where Jones was represented by counsel The Board of
Education also granted a hearing, which resulted in another unani-
mous decision not to reemploy Jones. Plaintiff then filed suit under
the Civil Rights Act of 187110 alleging racial discrimination under
color of state law.
The district court found" that plaintiff's race had influenced nei-
ther the evaluations nor the decision of the school board.1'kIn finding
Jones an ineffective teacher, the school had used a standardized eval-
uation form and three evaluators. 13 Moreover, Jones was replaced by
a black woman, who subsequently resigned and also was replaced by
a black woman." Recognizing that the defendant school district must
show an absence of racial motivation by clear and convincing evi-
dence,5 the district court concluded that the school board discharged
plaintiff solely because of professional incompetence.
Upon Jones' appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered the "clearly
erroneous"' 6 stricture of appellate review in response to the "clear and
convincing" standard of proof required at trial. Recognizing that the
court may not decide factual issues already adjudicated by the lower
court unless they are clearly erroneous, 7 the Fourth Circuit held that
I One of the black members of the Advisory Board was absent from the meeting
during which Jones' retention was discussed. Id. The Fourth Circuit has consistently
required scrupulous attention to due process rights at school board hearings on dis-
charge. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1975); Huntley v. North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ., No. 75-2096 (4th Cir. June 14, 1976), disposition recorded
538 F.2d 324.
10 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
" The action of the district court regarding due process was not challenged on
appeal. 528 F.2d at 416 n.1.
t Id. at 417.
' Id. at 416. All the evaluators were white.
" Id. at 417. The majority noted the excellent evaluations given Jones' two succes-
sors in the recitation of facts, id., and in holding that the evaluations were not merely
pretextual. Id. at 417 n.8.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973).
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides in pertinent part: "[flindings of facts shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." See generally C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CivIL § 2571 (1971).
," The Jones court relied on Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
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the higher standard of proof did not expand the scope of appellate
review.'8 The majority noted that the appellate court should not be
bound by the determinations below solely because they were based
on substantial evidence, but held the lower court's judgment not
clearly erroneous because it was based on competent testimony. Ab-
sent the "definite- and firm conviction that a mistake [had] been
committed,"' 9 the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district
court properly found for the school board.
2
1
The Fourth Circuit majority relied in part on the Supreme Court's
decision in Keyes v. School District No. 121 which delineated the
U.S. 100, 123 (1969), to establish that an appellate court, applying the clearly erro-
neous standard to findings of fact of a district court sitting without a jury, may not
decide facts de novo.
Zenith Radio was a patent infringement action in which the district court found
that antitrust laws had been violated, 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1965). The court of
appeals reversed the finding of facts regarding restriction of competition, 388 F.2d 25
(7th Cir. 1967), but the Supreme Court held that the appellate court exceeded appro-
priate review by failing to observe the trial court's proximity to the facts. 395 U.S. at
118, 123.
" 528 F.2d at 417.
"Id., quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948). The Gypsum test is as follows: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. The Supreme
Court recently declared, in a suit involving racial discrimination in employment, that
the appropriate scope of appellate review is to determine whether the district court's
findings are clearly erroneous and whether that court had abused its discretion. Albe-
marie Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975).
" 528 F.2d at 418. The court of appeals, following its earlier decision in Jersey Ins.
Co. v. Hefiron, 242 F.2d 136, 139 (4th Cir. 1957), rejected an inquiry into whether there
existed doubt as to the lower court's finding. An expression of doubt would apparently
constitute substantial questioning of the trial court's decision. Presumably a doubt is
less demonstrable than a firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. See, e.g,
Smith v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 143 Mo. 33, 34, 44 S.W. 718, 719 (1898) (doubt implies
want of settled conviction).
21 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Keyes was the first school desegregation case to reach the
Supreme Court from outside the South, arising from the segregation of "Anglos" and
"Hispanos" in the Denver school system. Keyes was also the first school desegregation
suit to be decided by the Supreme Court in the absence of a statutory scheme that
required or allowed segregation, whereas in previous cases, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), the Court dealt with de jure segregation. The Denver schools were segregated
de facto. The Court emphasized that the difference lies in the intent associated with
de jure segregation, but held that whenever any intent may be inferred the burden rests
on the school district to show the absence of racially motivated intent. 413 U.S. at 208-
09. See Note, Public School Desegregation and the Contours of Unconstitutionality:
The Denver School Board Case, 45 U. CoLO. L. REv. 457 (1974). See generally Note,
Constitutional Law-School Desegregation-Constitutional Duty to Desegregate De
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burden of proof necessary to defend a charge of racial discrimination
directed against an historically discriminatory school district. The
Court held that once the issue of segregation is raised by credible
testimony, the burden shifts to the school district to show that racial
animus is not a factor in the composition of the student bodies.2 The
Jones majority did not relate the holding of Keyes to the issue in
Jones other than to extract the clear and convincing proof standard.2
Judge Craven in his dissent, however, argued that Keyes demanded
that the defendant school system show a total absence of racial moti-
vation in discharging Jones. 24 The Pitt County system had an admit-
ted history of racial segregation,'- thus bringing it within the Keyes
mandate. While Judge Craven detected no racial animus, 26 he de-
scribed the exceptional burden of proof placed on school boards as
comtemplating the situation where the animus would go undetected,
and urged that affirming the lower court would abandon appellate
enforcement of the Keyes mandate.27
Reviewing the evidence, the dissent found significance in Jones'
assignment to a different teaching level and to a new facility after the
integration plan was implemented. Indeed, no suggestion of incom-
petence was made until this change occurred. The dissent particu-
larly noted the inference of racial discrimination that arose from the
equal distribution of black and white instructors leaving the system,
compared with the hiring ratio of one black for every five whites.?
Facto Segregation, Keyes v. School District Number 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), 23 EMORY
L.J. 293 (1974); Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern
Schoolhouse Doors, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. Rv. 124 (1974); Note, Keyes, the Key to
National Desegregation?, 3 CAP. L. Rav. 105 (1974); Note, Constitutional Law-School
Desegregation-De Facto Hangs On, 52 N.C.L. REv. 431 (1973).
413 U.S. at 209.
2 528 F.2d at 417 n.4. The court could have inferred de facto or de jure intent in
Jones from the ratio of hiring and firing of black teachers. See text accompanying note
28 infra. This would have enabled the court to have applied more effectively the Keyes
inquiry into motive which would have resulted in a more detailed and broader review
of the Pitt County employment pattern. The Fourth Circuit instead limited its inquiry
to the facts surrounding only Jones' dismissal.
21 528 F.2d at 419, (Craven, J., dissenting), citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189, 210 (1973). Neither the majority nor the dissent in Jones found it necessary
to relate the Keyes decision regarding student body segregation to racial discrimina-
tion in hiring instructors. See note 23 supra.
2 A history of racial discrimination and segregation was admitted in, e.g., Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Chambers v. Board of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).
528 F.2d at 418 (Craven, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 419 (Craven, J., dissenting).
Id. at 420 (Craven, J., dissenting).
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However, the fact that Jones' replacements, both blacks, had re-_
ceived excellent performance evaluations was overlooked by the dis-
sent. Judge Craven did not accuse the school district of using the
evaluations as a pretext for discharge, but did say that the reports
were "largely subjective and wholly unsupported by the underlying
documentation."29 Concluding that the weight of the evidence 30
showed that the defendant has not met its burden, he declared, in
contrast to the majority's finding, that "a mistake has been commit-
ted."
The Jones decision on the scope of appellate review indicates that
the Fourth Circuit would apply the same scrutiny to a district court's
judgment regardless of the standard of proof required at trial. The
court adhered to the prevailing rule that without substantial evidence
a judgment is clearly erroneous.2 In addition, the court rejected the
converse rule that a decision supported by substantial evidence may
not be clearly erroneous.33 Thus, the Fourth Circuit would substitute
its judgment for that of the trial court contrary to substantial evi-
dence, but only when it is left with a definite conviction that a mis-
take has been committed. The standard led the court to hold that the
higher burden of proof did not expand the scope of appellate review
in a racial discrimination suit. 4 The application of the Keyes stan-
dards, however, alters the circumstances of review. The majority's
effort to meet Keyes involved careful scrutiny of the charges while
maintaining the traditional limits of review. The dissent, critical of
this partial independence from Keyes, suggests that Keyes standards
require a new standard for appellate review in discrimination cases-
the complete absence of any racial motivation. This would be a signi-
ficant step, requiring, in effect, a defendant to prove a negative."
23 Id.
Judge Craven urged that the evidence must be reviewed as a whole, citing
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (court, in weighing evi-
dence, must take into account any item which fairly detracts from the positive weight
of the evidence).
1' 528 F.2d at 420 (Craven, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). See note 19 supra:
2 528 F.2d at 418 n.9. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PAMrCE AND PROCE-
DURE: CIVIL § 2585 (1971).
' The rule that a decision supported by substantial evidence may not be clearly
erroneous was applied in, e.g., Jackson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 422 F.2d
1272, 1275 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 855 (1970); Unitec Corp. v. Beatty Saf-
way Scaffold Co., 358 F.2d 470, 477 (9th Cir. 1966); West Am. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 295 F.2d 513, 515 (10th Cir. 1961). Its earliest application appears to be in Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Kepler, 116 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1941).
31 528 F.2d at 417.
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The Jones disposition manifests the Fourth Circuit's desire to em-
ploy conventional strictures of appellate review rather than embrace
new standards.
Unavailability of Damages Relief in Housing Discrimination Suits
Recognizing that overt racial discrimination was foreclosed by the
Civil Rights Act of 1968,36 the defendant in United States v. Long3 7
maintained the racial segregation of his rental property by the use of
coded rental applications.-" In addition, black applicants were sub-
jected to credit checks three times as often as whites, and a deposit
was required of ninety-five percent of the blacks, if accepted, as op-
posed to only ten percent of the whites. 9 The Department of Justice
sued for an injunction plus affirmative relief.40 Finding that defen-
dant discriminated in renting apartments, the district court issued an
injunction.4 Although the court had no direct precedent, it required
defendant to pay justified damage claims."
Reviewing the relief granted by the district court, the Fourth Cir-
cuit identified three remedies available for housing discrimination:
private administrative actions,4 3 private civil suits,4 and suits by the
" The burden of proof language in Keyes was applied only to "the special context
of school desegregation . . ." 413 U.S. at 208. In addition, the Keyes Court suggested
that there are no "hard-and-fast standards governing the allocation of the burden of
proof in every situation." Id. at 209. The Court required only sufficient evidence of a
lack of segregative intent to support such a finding, and did not require absolute proof.
Id. at 210.
1 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et. seq. (1970).
37 537 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 45 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976)
(No. 75-1920).
" United States v. Long, EQUAL OPPOR. IN HOUSING (P-H) 13,631 (D.S.C. Jan.
14, 1974). Defendant's clerks coded the applications so as to maintain intra-office
segregation of the forms. Black persons requesting housing were shown only those
apartments defendant wished to keep all-black, even if housing was also available in
his "white" apartment buildings.
39 Id.
,o The affirmative relief sought included an order compelling future compliance
with the Civil Rights Act, display of equal housing signs, and damages for the victims.
537 F.2d at 1151.
1' United States v. Long, EQUAL OPPOR. IN HOUSING (P-H) 13,631 (D.S.C. Jan.
14, 1974).
11 Id. The district court appointed and authorized a special master to hear claims,
as provided in FED. R. Civ. P. 53. If appropriate, he was to make damage award
recommendations to the court. The question of whether a jury was required was certi-
fied to the court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), but the Fourth
Circuit's decision on the remedy precluded disposition. 537 F.2d at 1155.
11 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970) provides for filing complaints with the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development.
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Attorney General in cases of "general public importance" to obtain
relief including "injunction, restraining order or other order."4 5 Faced
with the question of whether "or other order" may include the dam-
age remedy, the court declared that the context denoted equitable
relief only.46 Thus, by ordering legal relief the district court had ex-
ceeded its authority. The Long court approved the lower court's order
which required not only cessation of discriminatory acts but affirma-
tive efforts to correct past acts.47 The court also noted that the dam-
age remedy remained open to the victims by way of private civil
suit.,
In support of the damage remedy, the government argued that
victims of employment discrimination received back pay and that
this relief was analogous to that sought in Long. The court conceded
that such relief had been granted in both private" and government"0
11 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "The rights granted by...
this title may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United States district courts
without regard to the amount in controversy and in appropriate State or local courts
of general jurisdiction." In Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974), a private civil suit, the Seventh Circuit held that
black homebuyers had a cause of action against defendant for a claim of damages equal
to the increase in prices of houses caused by racial discrimination.
Is 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970) provides for civil action by the Attorney General when
persons have been denied the rights granted by the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
,' 537 F.2d at 1153.
The injunction required defendant to cease the discriminatory acts, and to undo
by affimative action past acts by advertising as an equal opportunity housing source,
and to display the Housing and Urban Development's logo (an easily identifiable sign
indicating compliance with H.U.D. regulations) on its advertisements and on the sign
in front of the agency. Id. Cf. note 40 supra.
1' 537 F.2d at 1154. See note 44 supra. Plaintiffs could also pursue remedies
granted in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970).
The court did not address the burden of costly litigation nor the judicial economy
of single litigation. If the court allowed the damage remedy, the United States would
have been in a position analogous to the representative in a class action suit. Class
actions serve an important function and should be encouraged, Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 977 (1969). In addition, persons
with claims smaller than the costs of suit, bound together, have an incentive to pursue
a remedy. See generally Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United
States of America, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 343 1974; Note, The Rule 23(b) Class Actions:
An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J..1123 (1974)..
1' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970) authorizes back pay awards upon a finding that an
employer discriminated intentionally. Courts have characterized this as equitable re-
lief. See, e.g., Meadows v. Ford Motor Corp., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975); Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). Cf. note 43 supra.
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970) contains no provision for back pay. Back pay has
been approved, however, in United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.
1973), and in United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972), based
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suits regarding employment discrimination, but held that these suits
were not controlling.5' The Fourth Circuit distinguished a back pay
award from a damage award for housing discrimination by reasoning
that in the former the court forces the party to disgorge wrongfully
withheld funds belonging to the victim of discrimination, whereas in
the latter a damage award for losses due to discrimination is not such
a recovery. 2 The court relied on Curtis v. Loether,55 a private housing
discrimination suit, where the Supreme Court held that a suit for
damages brought by a victim of racial discrimination is clearly a
request for legal relief.54 Persuaded that the relief sought in Long
failed to meet the definition of restitution necessary to characterize
it as equitable, the court held that the relief granted below exceeded
the trial court's remedial jurisdiction. 5
Consequently, future victims of racial discrimination who re-
ceive injunctive relief as a result of a Justice Department suit must
bring a private suit to recover damages and must prove discrimina-
tion anew. 56 Generally, the cost of this litigation will be borne by the
victims, although a class action status would diminish expenses.
5 7
The victims' use of the prior decision in proving discrimination in a
subsequent suit for damages may be limited, as the courts are unsure
in part upon the intentional discrimination of the employers. Cf. note 44 supra.
' 537 F.2d at 1155.
52 Id., citing Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1121-22 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub
nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
415 U.S. 189 (1974).
s' Id. at 195. In an analogous case, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454 (1975), the Court held that private suits and EEOC claims are independent,
but not mutually exclusive. Id. at 459, 461.
537 F.2d at 1153.
' The decision holding Long's acts to be violative would be stare decisis in a
subsequent suit. However, courts are unsure of the affirmative use of collateral estop-
pel in a second suit concerning the same facts. The "Bernhard doctrine", Bernhard v.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Assn., 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), which
allows offensive use of collateral estoppel despite-a lack of mutuality, has not been
adopted by the Supreme Court. The Court, in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), acknowledged the defensive use of col-
lateral estoppel, but did not endorse offensive use.
Victims of discrimination may, of course, bring suit prior to, or concurrently with,
a suit by the Attorney General. See note 43 supra.
-" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides for class action suits in the federal courts. See
note 48 supra. Under 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970), a court is allowed to award attorneys'
fees to a prevailing plaintiff if such plaintiff is unable to bear the costs himself. The
courts of appeals are in conflict regarding the standard to be applied in awarding
attorneys' fees. Compare Jeanty v. McKee & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir.
1974) (liberal award) with Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976) (fees should be
awarded only if defendant showed bad faith).
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of the permissibility of using collateral estoppel offensively. 58 By re-
fusing the district court's damage remedy, the Long court has possi-
bly created a circuity of action and allowed protracted litigation even
though Congress authorized the Attorney General to seek to diminish
discriminatory acts." Although private suits and suits by the Justice
Department rest on different considerations,1 the intent of the legis-
lation is to eliminate racial discrimination by the most effective
means.'
D. Rights to Privacy
Private Hospital's Liability for Refusal to Give Abortion
In Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.,' the Fourth Cir-
cuit sought to define state action as it applies to a private hospital'
that receives federal funds. Plaintiff sought an abortion at the medi-
cal center after a physician with staff privileges agreed to perform the
operation. The hospital, however, refused her request on the basis of
a West Virginia criminal statute3 which proscribed elective abortions,
allowing the procedure only to protect the health of the mother.
Plaintiff sought an injunction under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,1
alleging state action based upon the medical center's receipt of large
public grants for hospital construction. These grants, known as Hill-
See note 56 supra.
" See note 44 supra.
8 See notes 43 & 44 supra.
" 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (1970).
1 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975).
2 Public hospitals may not ban the use of their facilities for all abortions. Nyberg
v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 891 (1974).
While the Eighth Circuit suggested following the tripart test in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163 (1973), the court did not fashion a specific order. 495 F.2d at 1345.
W. VA. CODE ANN. 61-2-8 (1966) provides that commission of abortion, or assist-
ing in such an act, is a felony. If the woman dies in the course of an abortion, the actor
shall be guilty of murder. Actors who, in good faith, attempt to save the life of the
mother or child by such a procedure are excluded.
529 F.2d at 640; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Plaintiff brought a class action suit.
The court noted that the fact that members of the class were not specifically identified
supported, rather than undercut, class action status, citing Jack v. American Linen
Supply Co., 498 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1974) (class action involving employment
discrimination against blacks permitted although plaintiff could not identify all mem-
bers of the class because the class existed and needed protection), and Yaffe v. Powers,
454 F.2d 1362, 1367 (1st Cir. 1972) (class action to enjoin police from interfering with
demonstrators not foreclosed because class action was a better avenue than individual
suit to pursue this claim).
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Burton funds,5 are given to private hospitals by the federal govern-
ment, in return for a comprehensive health services delivery plan
which the hospital must submit to the United States Surgeon Gen-
eral Unless this plan meets minimum standards for an out-patient
facility7 the government may withhold funds for non-compliance.,
The West Virginia criminal abortion statute,9 which makes aiding
an abortion a felony, was declared unconstitutional by the Charleston
Area court"0 in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade"
and Doe v. Bolton. 12 In those cases, the Texas 3 and Georgia 4 statutes
respectively were held unconstitutional because they interfered with
a woman's right to choose to terminate a pregnancy during the first
trimester. 5 The Charleston Area court also relied on Roe to hold that
the irreparable injury prerequisite for the issuance of an injunction
existed, and that mootness was not an issue,6 even though plaintiff
procured an abortion outside of West Virginia before judgment in the
district court, but after institution of suit. 7
In its review of the state action issue, the Charleston Area court
held that the medical center acted under color of state law by its
receipt of Hill-Burton funds.'8 Further, the defendant was affiliated
with a state university, received Medicare and Medicaid funds, 9 and
42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1970). The legislative history is found in H.R. REP. 2519,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1558 (1946), reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. SEEV. 1558.
42 U.S.C. § 291d.(a)(1) (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 291d.(a)(6) (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 291g. (1970).
See note 3 supra.
" 529 F.2d at 645.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See generally Cane, Whose Right to Life? Implications of
Roe v. Wade, 7 FAM. L.Q. 413 (1973); Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process
and the Right of Abortion, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1974); Note, 87 HARV. L. REv. 75
(1973); Note, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: The Compelling State Interests Test in
Substantive Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 628 (1973).
"1 TEX. PENAL CODE Arts. 1191-1195 (1948) (unconstitutional, Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).
', GA. CODE § 26-1202A (1972) (current version at GA. CODE § 26-1201 (1975)).
410 U.S. at 154 (Roe), 195 (Doe).
" 529 F.2d at 644. The Supreme Court described such legal actions as "'capable
of repetition yet evading review'" 410 U.S. at 125, quoting Southern Pac. Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
1' 529 F.2d at 644.
Id.
" Medicare and Medicaid are federal programs providing reimbursement to medi-
cal facilities and personnel for services rendered to certain needy persons. 42 U.S.C. §
1395 et seq. (1970).
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received state subsidies in support of its maternity clinic. The court
declared that the district court ignored a clear line of Fourth Circuit
decisions when it dismissed the suit."0 Particularly applicable was an
employment discrimination case, Duffield v. Charleston Area Medi-
cal Center, Inc.,21 where the Fourth Circuit held that the same defen-
dant was involved sufficiently with state action by receipt of Hill-
Burton funds.2 In addition to the financial nexus, the Fourth Circuit
noted that the hospital's refusal was motivated primarily by at-
tempted compliance with a state criminal statute.2 Recognizing that
the Supreme Court had found state involvement in a custom that has
the force of law,2" the court of appeals held that an actual statute
necessarily meets the requirement of state action.
The Fourth Circuit also recognized that its policy was contrary to
that reached in other circuits dealing with Hill-Burton funds. 6 The
2 529 F.2d at 642. The court cited Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical Center,
Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974), see text accompanying notes 21-22 infra; Christhilf
v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Assn., 496 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 1974) (Hill-Burton
funds inextricably tied private hospital to state, which imposed due process obligations
on hospital in its discharge of a physician); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,
323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), see text accompanying
notes 30-35 infra.
21 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974).
21 Id. at 515.
23 529 F.2d at 643.
21 Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Adickes, plaintiff, a white,
was refused service at a defendant's lunch counter when she appeared with a number
of black persons. Defendant acknowledged that service to blacks as well as whites was
required by the law, but insisted that, by local custom, a white person accompanying
a black person would not be served. The Supreme Court held that plaintiff's action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) stated a cause of action and that the recognized custom
had the force of law.
2 Most courts have not assumed that a statute meets the state action requirement
under Adickes, requiring state involvement in addition to, or in lieu of, a custom. See,
e.g., Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). Arguably,
one court has made the same attempt as the Fourth Circuit in Charleston Area to
assume that a statute satisfies the state action requirement. In Jennings v. Patterson,
460 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit held a motion to dismiss a private race
discrimination action improper, as there was a possibility that state action could be
found in the putatively private actions. In a later appeal, Jennings v. Patterson, 488
F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1974), no mention of state action was made.
26 529 F.2d at 642. Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp., 507 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir.
1974); Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosp., Inc., 487 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir.
1973); Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), disposition recorded 506
F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Seventh Circuit, in Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital, 27 arrived at the
opposite conclusion on facts similar to those of Charleston Area. In
Bellin Memorial, a physician with staff privileges at the hospital
agreed to perform an abortion but the hospital refused to allow the
use of its facilities. The Seventh Circuit reversed the injunction
granted below, holding that absent state influence over hospital pol-
icy, the hospital retained its right to refuse abortions despite financial
aid.?
The Seventh Circuit found unpersuasive plaintiff's argument that
receipt of Hill-Burton funds, and operation of the hospital under the
attendant regulations, was sufficient state action to characterize the
defendant's acts as "under color of law. '2 Plaintiff in Bellin
Memorial particularly relied on a Fourth Circuit decision, Simkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,3 0 which held that a hospital re-
ceiving Hill-Burton funds acted under color of law when it racially
discriminated in hiring.3 1 The Bellin Memorial court distinguished
Simkins by noting that Simkins was decided on the ground of govern-
ment involvement at the policy level in the activity challenged .32 The
court found no such involvement in Bellin Memorial, noting that the
state neither encouraged nor discouraged elective abortions, and this
fact precluded a finding of "joint participation."
Bellin Memorial, however, while conflicting with the Fourth Cir-
cuit's Charleston Area decision in its ultimate conclusion, is not inap-
posite. In addition to the receipt of Hill-Burton funds, Charleston
27 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973). See Note, Constitutional Law-State Ac-
tion-Private Hospitals Receiving Hill-Burton Funds Do Not Act Under Color of State
Authority in Denying Access to Their Facilities forAbortions, 62 GEO. L.J. 1783 (1974);
Note Constitutional Law-State Actions-Denial of Abortion by Private Hospital Re-
ceiving Federal Financial Support Under the Hill-Burton Program Does Not Consti-
tute State Action, 2 FORDHAM L.J. 611 (1974); Note, Constitutional Law-Abortion-
Private Hospital May Refuse To Perform Abortion, 18 ST. L.L.J. 440 (1974).
479 F.2d at 761.
I d.
20 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
21 Id. at 966.
2 In Simkins, the Fourth Circuit found involvement of the United States Surgeon
General at the policy level. He approved the hiring practices of the hospital, by way
of certifying that the facility's "separate but equal"' status satisfied the Non-
Discrimination Report required by 42 C.F.R. § 53.112 (1963). 323 F.2d at 965. In Bellin
Memorial, the Seventh Circuit found no involvement, federal or state, in the policy
decision regarding abortions. 479 F.2d at 761.
Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961) "joint
participation" found when restaurant was located in a state-operated parking garage).
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Area involved reliance on a state criminal statute.34 The hospital's
relationship with the state also included state financial support and
alliance with a state university. Thus the Fourth Circuit decision in
Charleston Area rests upon a greater quantum of state involvement
than does Bellin Memorial.
The Fourth Circuit would not likely find state action in the ab-
sence of the Hill-Burton funds. Courts have held that both significant
control of policy by the state" and cloaking a private agency with the
appearance of state authority 7 was sufficient state action. One court
has held that the state's support must be affirmative and significant,
as measured by the effectiveness of the defendant's conduct.3 In
Charleston Area, the court did not assess the amount of control re-
tained by West Virginia in its supervision of the maternity clinic and
affiliation with the state university. If direct policy-making control
were found, or if the public were led to equate the facility with the
state, the state action requirements would apparently be met. The
Fourth Circuit's decision leaves this question of alternative defenses
unclear, as it rests on the cumulative effect of affiliation and funding.
The Charleston Area Medical Center raised the alternative de-
fense of Congress's recent policy statement in the Health Programs
Extension Act of 1973,'3 that a hospital regulation regarding elective
abortions is not state action merely because of federal aid, if the
regulation is based on religious beliefs or moral convictions. This
"conscience clause" provides that receipt of funds empowers neither
the courts nor public officials to require a facility to perform abor-
tions." One court has held that this policy precludes the decision that
31 The Charleston Area court did not discuss the significance of the hospital's
alleged good faith reliance on the statute, holding only that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it was irreconcilable with Roe. The court ordered an injunction to
require the hospital to ignore the statute. 529 F.2d at 645.
But cf. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
where the only state involvement cited was the receipt of Hill-Burton funding and
compliance with the required comprehensive plan. Id. at 967. The court characterized
the hospital's operation as an integral part of a joint effort involving state and federal
planning to insure promotion and maintenance of public health. Id. Because the
Charleston Area court relied heavily on Simkins to conclude that the facility could not
refuse abortions, the court possibly would have found state action on Hill-Burton
funding alone.
3' See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Pennsylvania v. Board of
Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
1 Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
SId.
42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(a)(2) (Supp. 11, 1973).
40 Id.
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the use of Hill-Burton funds creates state action.4' The Sixth Circuit,
however, invalidated a Kentucky conscience clause" allowing public
facilities to be held harmless for refusal to terminate a pregnancy on
demand. In Wolfe v. Schoering, 43 the Sixth Circuit declared that the
Kentucky statute unconstitutionally allowed a hospital to circum-
vent Roe by permitting a hospital to refuse to terminate a first trimes-
ter pregnancy." The Wolfe court did, however, suggest that a more
narrowly drafted conscience clause would be constitutional if limited
to second and third trimester pregnancies.
4 5
In Charleston Area, the hospital argued that the enactment of the
congressional conscience clause required dismissal of the suit. The
Fourth Circuit, however, found that the hospital's motivation and its
justification for refusal rested on the criminal statute alone, and not
on a religious belief or moral conviction.4" Thus, the conscience clause
defense as preclusive of a finding of state action is apparently still a
viable defense for hospitals in the Fourth Circuit. Because the court
found only that the conscience clause statute was inapplicable to the
Charleston Area facts,47 there was no intimation of what action the
court would take when a facility relied solely on such a clause. Conse-
quently, a private hospital placing primary reliance on a conscience
clause to excuse restriction on abortions may succeed in avoiding
judicial intrusion by removing the state action association.
Employer Has Right to Enforce Hair Length Standards
While hair style regulation has been upheld in four circuits, 8 four
" Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Idaho 1973).
,' Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (1974).
' Civ. No. 75-1318 (6th Cir. Sept. 18, 1976).
Id. at 4, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973).
Civ. No. 75-1318, slip op. at 9. The court refused to address the issue of when a
public hospital may refuse to perform abortions for non-ethical reasons, suggesting
that lack of personnel or facilities might foreclose a hospital from performing abortions.
The court did not require a hospital to perform the procedures, but held only that the
state may not ban abortions for ethical reasons. Id. at 7 n.6.
" The court concluded that the medical center did not base its refusal on moral
grounds because no trial testimony was adduced to that effect. 529 F.2d at 642 n.7,
643 n.11.
Id. at 642 n.7.
" Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975) (unless pretextual,
hair regulations for males when none exist for females not sex discrimination); Brown
v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., 523 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 862 (1975)
(no denial of due process to discharge an employee for failing to follow hair restric-
tions); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (firing
employee for failure to conform to hair regulations when local population upset by long
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circuits have recorded opposing judgments.49 The Supreme Court's
recent decision in Kelley v. Johnson,5 holding that a police depart-
ment may regulate hair styles, has not ended this circuit conflict, as
the Court founded its decision on the ground that a state may require
its police officers to be readily identifiable and uniform in appear-
ance." The Fourth Circuit, in Earwood v. Continental Southeastern
Lines, Inc.,52 upheld the right of an employer to enforce hair grooming
standards, relying in part on Johnson.
Continental's bus drivers, who were all male, 5 were required to
wear their hair so that it would not touch the shirt or fall over the
ears. 4 Plaintiff Earwood's hair style was described as "combed over
his ears. . thick upon his neck."" Plaintiff's employment was sus-
pended until he complied with the regulations, so Earwood filed suit
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 alleging that the
regulations were the result of sexual stereotyping. 57 The district court
granted injunctive and restitutionary relief,58 but the Fourth Circuit
reversed.
The Fourth Circuit proposed a two-step analysis to determine the
existence of sex discrimination.59 The first step was to identify non-
hair on males not sex discrimination); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d
895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975) (EEOC regulations addressed
sex per se, and not grooming standards, as qualifications for employment).
" Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069
(8th Cir. 1971); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1971); Breen v. Kahl,
419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
425 U.S. 238 (1976).
' Id. at 248.
52 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976).
13 At the time of the suit only men were employed as bus drivers. Women were
not barred from employment with Continental, and no claim of sex discrimination
against women was advanced. Id. at 1350 n.1.
5' Id. at 1350 n.2.
Id. at 1350.
s' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1972) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or to otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
" The term "sexual stereotyping" appears in the district court's holding that
Continental discriminated illegally against Earwood. 539 F.2d at 1350. The term was
also used in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 999 (1971). See note 62 infra.
"1 539 F.2d at 1350. Plaintiff left Continental's employ instead of complying with
the regulations. Thus back pay was the only issue in the suit. Id. at 1350 n.3.
1' Id. at 1350. The Earwood court relied on Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d
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compliance with the statute. In the event of non-compliance, the
second step would be to inquire into the existence of a justifying
"bona fide occupational qualification.""0 The Earwood court con-
cluded that the hair length standards were not used as a pretext for
sex-based exclusion from employment." In addition, the court held
that hair length is not an immutable characteristic 2 that demands
protection of the law, because it is changeable at will. The employer's
compliance with the statute made analysis of the second step unnec-
essary.
Following the "sound reasoning" of four courts of appeals, 3 and
citing Kelley v. Johnson," which sustained police department hair
regulations, the majority based its reasoning on an inspection of
whether employment opportunity was impaired. Although Earwood
could not continue employment with Continental because of his hair
style, the court concluded that no irrationality was involved" and
sustained the company regulations.66
Judge Winter argued in dissent that the case was not ripe for final
adjudication. He noted the absence of a claim of sex discrimination
in hiring and stated that whether defendant would treat male and
female drivers differently regarding hair length was unclear. 7 The
dissent further stated that the possibility of alternate methods of
compliance was uncertain. Suggesting that women might meet the
grooming standards by wearing their hair "upswept," Judge Winter
questioned whether Earwood might satisfy the rule by securing his
hair underneath his cap. Concluding that grooming standards are
1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973), which involved a claim by male employees that the employer's
hair regulations discriminated against them, for the two-step analysis.
539 F.2d at 1350, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
" 539 F.2d at 1351.
" Id. Immutable characteristics are those that belong to a person and cannot be
overcome. Accordingly, they may not be used by an employer as an occupational
qualification, unless it is a bona fide occupational qualification. An example of im-
mutable characteristics given protection is found in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542 (1971) (employer could not refuse to hire women with pre-school age
children when accepting men with such children); see also Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 999 (1971) (airline's no-marriage
rule for stewardesses invalid).
'3 See note 48 supra.
" 425 U.S. 238 (1976). See Note, 62 A.B.A.J. 782 (1976).
5 The Earwood court drew the irrationality standard from Kelley v. Johnson, 425
U.S. 238, 247 (1976). The Johnson Court suggested that police officers are subject to
hair regulations unless the rule is arbitrary and thus a denial of the employee's liberty
to choose personal habits. Id. at 248.
539 F.2d at 1351.
£7 Id. at 1353 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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clearly "terms and conditions" ' of employment, the dissent read the
language of the statute, which is notably without legislative history,69
as plainly rejecting the sex-differentiated application of employment
qualifications.
Judge Winter's conclusion agrees with the ruling of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that sex-based en-
forcement of hair length is contrary to the Civil Rights Act. 0 The
EEOC has also ruled that an employer may not defend regulations
by suggesting that customer preference demands stereotypical
grooming.7' Normally, especially where legislative history is scant or
non-existent,7 2 the regulatory agency's decisions are to be granted
deference,7" but in Earwood the majority failed to mention the EEOC
guidelines. If the court had deferred to the EEOC, the opposite con-
clusion would have been reached in Earwood. The majority's failure
to do so casts doubt on the decision, as it rests on an incomplete
inspection of precedent.
The divergence of opinion among the circuits is less obvious than
that between the Fourth Circuit and the EEOC, as the appellate
decisions holding hair regulation violative of the statute all involve
high school students and not employees. 74 The overall conflict of opin-
ion, however, suggests that review and resolution by the Supreme
Court may be necessary. If the intent of the statute is to deprive
employers of the ability to prescribe sex-differentiated job qualifica-
tions, then clearly the deprivation of employment in Earwood is dis-
criminatory. If the intent of the statute is to prevent only pretextual
job discrimination, the Fourth Circuit's decision appears proper.
Supreme Court determination of this intent, or an appropriate con-
gressional declaration, would serve to clarify the purpose of the legis-
lation.
1 Id. at 1352 (Winter, J., dissenting), citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1972). See note
56 supra.
" The inclusion of the sex discrimination sections in the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was an attempt by opponents of the bill to defeat the Act. 110 CONG. Rc. 2577 (1964).
See also Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975).
70 The EEOC, in decision No. 71-1529 (CCH EEOC DEC. 6231 (1971)), held that
differing regulation of hair length on a male/female basis was contrary to the Act.
71 In decision No. 71-2343 (CCH EEOC DEC. 6256 (1971)), the EEOC declared
that customer preference is irrelevant as a concern of employers in formulating groom-
ing standards. The Commission reaffirmed that preferential hair regulations are a per
se violation in decision No. 72-1380 (CCH EEOC DEC. 6364 (1972)).
7, See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
73 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971); see also Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
11 See note 49 supra.
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Presence of Onlooker Dissolves Right of Sexual Privacy
The Fourth Circuit, in Lovisi v. Slayton,75 recently decided that
a married couple waived their right to privacy 76 when an onlooker was
invited to witness the couple's sexual conduct. Aldo and Margaret
Lovisi placed advertisements in "Swinger's Life" magazine, seeking
to contact third parties interested in sharing sexual experiences. Earl
Romeo Dunn answered one of the solicitations, and met with the
Lovisis. At one encounter, Margaret Lovisi performed fellatio on her
husband and on Dunn,77 and these acts were photographed. One of
the Lovisis' minor daughters, present in the bedroom during the acts,
displayed one of the photographs at her school. The Lovisis were
subsequently convicted of sodomy.
78
In denying the plaintiffs' habeas corpus petitions, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the presence of an onlooker dissolved the reasonable
expectation of privacy they would have had if alone.79 The court
declared that the admission of Dunn precluded the Lovisis from
selectively excluding the state as an unwelcome intruder. Based on
this waiver, the court denied relief and upheld the convictions."
The majority described situations in which sexual intimacy would
be protected outside the confines of the marital bedroom, such as
detailed recounting of the intimacies in conversation or books. The
dissent by Judge Winter attacked this as inconsistent with the hold-
ing."' Suggesting that the majority would agree that the Lovisis have
a constitutionally protected right to practice fellatio in private,82 the
"' 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3395 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1976) (No.
76-184).
"' The case was limited to the area of sexual privacy. See generally Note,
Extending the Right to Sexual Privacy, 2 WEST. ST. L. REv. 281 (1975); Note, Oral
Copulation: A Constitutional Curtain Must Be Drawn, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 523
(1974); Note, Sodomy and the Married Man, 3 U. RICH. L. Rav. 344 (1969).
11 The sexual conduct between Margaret Lovisi and Dunn was not in issue. The
court considered only the acts of Margaret Lovisi on her husband. 539 F.2d at 350.
7 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1975) provides in pertinent part:
[I1f any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute animal,
or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by or with
the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she
shall be guilty of a class 6 felony.
At the trial, Dunn testified for the prosecution. His participation in the acts
resulted in his deportation to his native Jamaica. 539 F.2d at 350 n.2.
7, Id. at 351.
" Id. at 352.
Id. at 354-55 (Winter, J., dissenting).
Id. The right to sexual privacy between consenting married adults was estab-
lished in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (dissemination of contraceptives and
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dissent could not discern why waiver occured by admitting an ob-
server but not by explicit recounting of the acts. The dissent further
suggested that application of the majority's reasoning would make a
couple criminally liable when seeking medical aid regarding sexual
problems 3 or when sharing the bedroom with family members. The
dissent cited the constitutional right of a woman, married or not, to
seek an abortion 4 and contraceptives" as declaring privacy to be
independent of both notions of secrecy, 8 and the presence of third
parties. The dissent also found a strong argument for privacy between
consenting adults regarding sexual activity based upon Supreme
Court precedent. 7 The dissent deferred assessment of the Supreme
Court's recent affirmance of a homosexual's conviction under the
Virginia sodomy statute," stating that the Court obscured the basis
for the action by not articulating its reasoning.
In a separate dissent, Judge Craven attempted to define these
rights as "personhood" or the "right to be left alone."88 Stressing that
the acts punished were between married persons, he found that only
moral repugnance could sustain the convictions, but opined that the
court cannot dictate the morals of "a husband and wife so despicably
disposed." 0
information regarding use protected); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (private
possession of erotica protected); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial
marriage protected); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (dissemination of
contraceptives protected).
" 539 F.2d at 355 (Winter, J., dissenting). Apparently the dissent overlooked the
right of a patient to invoke the doctor-patient privilege to preserve the confidentiality
of information transmitted when seeking medical advice. See generally FED. R. Ev.
501; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 98-105 (2d ed. 1972).
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See discus-
sion of Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975), in
Private Hospital's Liability for Refusal to Give Abortion supra.
" Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
' See note 82 supra.
" Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd 425
U.S. 901 (1976). Defendant's sodomy conviction was sustained because of the state's
right to foreclose deviant sexual behavior. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
"l 539 F.2d at 356 (Craven, J., dissenting).
" Id. In Arizona v. Bateman, 547 P.2d 6 (Ariz. 1976), the Arizona Supreme Court
decided that there is no right to sexual privacy except between married persons. Hold-
ing that it could not sit as a "super-legislature," the court upheld the state's sodomy
law. The Supreme Court affirmed Justice Rehnquist's decision to deny a motion for
stay of prison sentence while awaiting certiorari, declaring that grant of certiorari is
unlikely. 97 S. Ct. 1 (1976).
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